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Abstract
While considerable attention is devoted to legal scholarship, little has been 
written on the process by which academic writing on law evolves.  This paper departs 
from the existing pattern and examines five potential trajectories for legal scholarship.  
One is based on the idea that knowledge “accumulates” as part of “progress” towards 
a better understanding of the matters under study.  The second is the concept of the 
“paradigm”, derived from work done on the history and sociology of science.  The 
third focuses on the idea that academic endeavor concerning law yields useful ideas 
since market forces are at work.  The fourth is a “cyclical” thesis, based on the 
assumption that themes legal scholars write about arise on a reoccurring basis.  
Finally, legal scholarship can potentially be characterized in terms of fads and 
fashions.  
It appears that scholarly trends in law develop in a manner that is at least
partially consistent with each of the five potential trajectories identified.  At the same 
time, none captures fully the dynamics at work and indeed there is some conflict 
between the various paths available.  The paper tests these conjectures by focusing on 
a particular topic, namely corporate law.  The survey offered does not identify one of 
the five potential trajectories as being dominant.  Still, each does help to explain how 
corporate law scholarship has developed.  Correspondingly, for those who are
interested in why some ideas prosper whereas other claims “burn out”, this paper 
offers a “test-driven” analytical framework that can be applied to discern how 
academic writing on law evolves over time.    
I. INTRODUCTION
Legal academics, despite facing inevitable teaching and administrative 
pressures, spend a considerable portion of their career reading, discussing and 
producing legal scholarship.1  In so doing, most will develop a sense of why certain 
ideas spread and prosper whereas as other claims “burn out” or fail to capture 
attention in the first place.  Still, while academic lawyers may make assumptions 
about the trajectory of legal scholarship, their understanding of the topic will almost 
certainly be intuitive only.  This is because, despite the attention devoted to scholarly 
activity, there is little literature on the process by which academic writing on law 
evolves.  In other words, there is “no jurisprudence of legal scholarship”.2
A 2001 article by law professor Cass Sunstein illustrates the lack of attention 
devoted to the trajectory of academic literature on law.  He argues in this paper that in 
law ideas spread via academic “fads” rather than by virtue of being “good”.  In so 
doing, he discusses only briefly why legal scholarship might evolve differently than in 
the manner he suggests.3  In so doing, perhaps he was assuming that alternative 
theories were so well-known that articulation would be superfluous.  In fact, however, 
1 John Gava, Scholarship and Community, 16 SYDNEY L. REV. 443, 443 (1994).
2 George P. Fletcher, Two Modes of Legal Thought, 90 YALE L.J. 970, 970 
(1981).  The situation has not changed recently:  Deborah L. Rhode, Legal 
Scholarship, 115 HARV. L. REV. 1327, 1327 (2002).   
3 Cass R. Sunstein, Foreword:  On Academic Fads and Fashions, 99 MICH. L. 
REV. 1251, 1253-54 (2001).  He only included his discussion of the topic at the 
suggestion of several commentators on an earlier draft (at 1253, n. 5).  Sunstein in fact 
was critiquing the notion that there is a “market” for legal scholarship, discussed infra
notes xx to xx and accompanying text.    
2a search for a fully developed analysis of the trajectory of legal scholarship will 
probably be in vain.4
This paper departs from the existing pattern and examines various possible 
ways in which academic work concerning law evolves.  Such an exercise might be 
thought by some to constitute introverted navel-gazing.  The volume of legal 
scholarship is, however, mushrooming and there indeed is a growing literature on the 
genre.5  Given all of this intellectual endeavor, it is appropriate to pause and seek to 
discern the trajectory of legal scholarship.   
No one is truly competent to evaluate properly the overall state of legal 
scholarship.6  Correspondingly, this paper will not seek to determine in a definitive 
way the manner in which academic writing on law evolves.  Instead, it is more of a 
thought experiment, with the central objective being to provide a platform for further 
analysis.  Part II of the paper begins the exercise by identifying five potential 
trajectories for legal scholarship.  
4 The most thorough treatment of which the author is aware is David Kennedy, 
When Renewal Repeats:  Thinking Against the Box, 32 N.Y.U. J. INT’L. L. & POL. 335 
(2000), though the purpose of this article was to discuss international law rather than 
legal scholarship generally.  
5 On the volume of legal scholarship, see Peter Birks, The Academic and the 
Practitioner, 18 LEGAL STUD. 397, 398 (1998); Reinhard Zimmermann, Law Reviews:  
A Foray Through a Strange World, 47 EMORY L.J. 659, 692-93 (1998); Darla L. 
Daniel, Of Deckchairs, Icebergs and Gestalt Shifts:  Unger, Kahn, and a Student of 
Contemporary Legal Thought, 72 U. COLO. L. REV. 851, 852 (2001).  On the 
literature on legal scholarship, see Mary B. Beazley and Linda H. Edwards, The 
Process and the Product:  A Bibliography of Scholarship About Legal Scholarship, 49 
MERCER L. REV. 741 (1998).   
6 David P. Bryden, Scholarship about Scholarship, 63 U. COLO. L. REV. 641, 
641 (1992).   
3The first of the five trajectories Part II discusses is based on the idea that
knowledge “accumulates” as part of “progress” towards an improved understanding 
of the matters under study.  The second is the concept of the “paradigm”, derived 
from work done on the history and sociology of science.  The third focuses on the idea 
that academic endeavor concerning law yields a “better” product over time since 
market forces are at work.  The fourth is a “cyclical” thesis, grounded in the 
assumption that much legal scholarship revisits on a reoccurring basis themes 
previously explored.  The fifth candidate is Sunstein’s thesis that scholarly trends in 
law can be characterized in terms of fads and fashions.  Part II concludes by offering a 
tentative hypothesis, this being that each of the five trajectories identified potentially 
influences academic writing on law to some degree.  At the same time, none captures 
fully the dynamics at work and indeed there is some conflict between the various 
paths available.  
In order to test the conjectures offered in part II, Part III of the paper 
undertakes a case study of a particular field, namely corporate law.  The case study 
begins with an overview of theoretical corporate law scholarship, offered from 
historical and cross-border perspectives.  Part III then assesses whether scientific 
methodology has had a substantial influence on how the relevant literature has 
evolved.  After this, insights derived from the history and sociology of science will be 
relied upon to offer a précis of corporate law scholarship, together with a matching 
critique.  This will be followed by an assessment whether a marketplace for ideas has 
helped to foster “better” academic writing on corporate law.  Next, there will be 
discussion of whether a strong cyclical dimension is present.  Part III concludes with 
4an examination of the extent to which corporate law scholarship has evolved in 
accordance with Sunstein’s account of fads and fashions.   
Part IV offers a conclusion.  One theme is that the corporate law case study set 
out in Part III lends support to the hypothesis developed in part II, namely that various 
dynamics – some in at least partial conflict – influence the path of legal scholarship.  
Another point made is that the test case was a fair one.  Corporate law was chosen as 
the subject matter for a pragmatic reason:  it is the author’s chosen area of research.  
Still, as part IV will discuss, the attributes of this particular field conform sufficiently 
to the norm in legal scholarship to ensure that the case study was appropriate.  Finally, 
it is acknowledged that the pluralist verdict this paper offers concerning potential 
trajectories will not be a fully satisfying one for those seeking definitive answers.7
Still, the point is made that some type of hedging appears inevitable (and prudent) 
since there is, as of yet, “no jurisprudence of legal scholarship”.   
Before proceeding, it is necessary to clarify a threshold issue, which is to 
define what qualifies as legal scholarship.8  Its precise boundaries are uncertain.9  For 
7 For a criticism of “congenial pluralism”, see JOHN C.P. GOLDBERG, 
TWENTIETH CENTURY TORT THEORY, 85-86 (Vanderbilt University Law School Law 
& Economics Working Paper 02-15, 2002), forthcoming GEO. L.J., (2003).
8 There is a tendency to assume that everyone knows what is meant by 
scholarship in general and legal scholarship in particular:  David Feldman, The Nature 
of Legal Scholarship, 52 MOD. L. REV. 498, 498 (1989).
9 Kenneth Lasson, Scholarship Amok:  Excesses in the Pursuit of Truth and 
Tenure, 103 HARV. L. REV. 926, 935 (1990); Edward L. Rubin, Legal Scholarship, in
A COMPANION TO PHILOSOPHY OF LAW AND LEGAL THEORY 562, 562 (Dennis 
Patterson ed., 1996).  Legal dictionaries provide little assistance.  Perhaps the most 
helpful guidance is offered by the BUTTERWORTHS AUSTRALIAN LEGAL DICTIONARY
681 (Peter E. Nygh and Peter Butt, eds., 1997) (saying legal theory refers “to any 
5our purposes, though, it should be sufficient to say that legal scholarship constitutes 
the body of learning, and especially the academic research available, in the field of 
law.10  Under this definition, jurisprudence, which is concerned with questions 
regarding the nature of law, its general structure, its sources and so on, clearly 
qualifies.  Theoretical legal scholarship – which implies the use of intellectual 
disciplines external to law to carry out research on its economic, social or political 
implications – does as well.11  This is also the case with academic writing on law that 
has an explicit policy objective, such as promoting law reform.  Finally, “doctrinal” or 
“descriptive” publications, where the author seeks to organize and categorize legal 
rules (“doctrine”) in a systematic fashion, can be categorized as legal scholarship.12
While the “internal” focus of legal research of this nature means that it cannot be 
academic analysis of the law which requires a degree of abstraction from the 
principles stated in case and statute-based law”).
10 Cf. Ronald Benton Brown, A Cure for Scholarship Schizophrenia:  A 
Manifesto for Sane Productivity and Productive Sanity, 13 NOVA L. REV. 39, 39 
(1988).  
An alternative formulation would be “the body of work produced by university 
professors who teach in programs that prepare their students for careers in law”:  
Rubin, Legal Scholarship, supra note xx, at 562.  This, however, is probably too 
narrow because the definition excludes publications by judges and lawyers.  See 
Philip C. Kissam, The Evaluation of Legal Scholarship, 63 WASH. L. REV. 221, 222-
23 (1988); cf. Feldman, Nature, supra note xx, at 509.  On the extent to which 
academic work done on law by academics in disciplines other than law qualifies as 
legal scholarship, see Rubin, Legal Scholarship, supra note xx, 562-63; Edward L. 
Rubin, Law And and the Methodology of Law, [1997] WIS. L. REV. 521, 522-23. 
11 On this definition of theoretical legal scholarship and how it relates to writing 
about jurisprudence, see Brian R. Cheffins, Using Theory to Study Law:  A Company 
Law Perspective, 58 CAMBRIDGE L.J. 197, 198 (1998).  
12 Rubin, Legal, supra note xx, at 564-66; Richard A. Posner, The Present 
Situation in Legal Scholarship, 90 YALE L.J. 1113, 1113-16 (1981).  On various sub-
categories of doctrinal scholarship, see Kissam, supra note xx, at 230-35.  
6readily classified as legal theory,13 doctrinal writing undoubtedly constitutes a core 
element of the research available in the field of law.14
II. LEGAL SCHOLARSHIP TRAJECTORIES:  AN OVERVIEW
A. The “Cumulative” Model:  “Progress” Towards “Truth”
“Progress” is a complex notion.15  For instance, even among those who have 
explicitly acknowledged its past influence on society, there is some doubt about the 
agent of change (e.g. human initiative vs. cosmic intervention) and about whether 
there will be similar momentum in the future.16  Still, to the extent progress occurs, its 
general direction is clear:  betterment and improvement.17  Moreover, it is fair to say 
that the concept implies the steady accumulation of knowledge over time.18
13 Rubin, Legal, supra note xx, at 564-66. 
14 Cheffins, Using Theory, supra note xx at 197; Michael Chesterman and David 
Weisbrot, Legal Scholarship in Australia, 50 MOD. L. REV. 709, 722-24 (1987); 
Richard Posner, Legal Scholarship Today, 115 HARV. L. REV. 1315, 1317, 1320 
(2002). 
15 Indeed, at least one author of a book on the subject has refrained from offering 
a definition:  MARGARITA MATHIPOULOS, HISTORY AND PROGRESS – IN SEARCH OF 
THE EUROPEAN AND AMERICAN MIND 5 (1989) (saying that to “attempt to arrive at a 
conclusive definition of progress would be as presumptuous as trying to prove or 
disprove the existence of supernatural powers”).  
16 On these questions, see CHARLES VAN DOREN, THE  IDEA OF PROGRESS 5-6, 
13-15, 23, 31-32, 261-63 (1967). 
17 VAN DOREN, supra note xx, at 6; JOHN BAGNELL BURY, THE IDEA OF 
PROGRESS:  AN INQUIRY INTO ITS ORIGIN AND GROWTH 2, 5 (1924).  
18 VAN DOREN, supra note xx, at 324, 333; ROBERT NISBET, HISTORY OF THE  
IDEA OF PROGRESS 5 (1980); Michael D. Birnhack, The Idea of Progress in Copyright 
Law, 1 BUFF. INTELL. PROP. J. 3, 13-14  (2001).  Still, there are some who contend 
that cumulativity may not be an essential element of progress.  See, for example, 
7Drawing these themes together, a first potential trajectory for legal scholarship 
is “cumulative” in nature, with the presumption being that academics will be making
headway in addressing issues considered important.  To elaborate, legal scholars, 
being mindful of existing controversies, build upon the work of their predecessors.  
Over time, outstanding issues are resolved and new insights are derived from those 
resolutions.19  Sustained intellectual enquiry can thus be expected to yield a “better” 
understanding of the topics under examination.   
Natural science is the intellectual endeavor where the sort of accumulation of 
knowledge just described is thought of as taking place in its purest form.20  The 
classic conception of scientific understanding is that it improves as part of an 
unfolding story as prior knowledge is used as the foundation to improve our 
comprehension of the world.21  Scientists, under this view, “progress” towards the 
“truth” by relying on “scientific method”, which constitutes objective enquiry founded 
on the safeguards of explicit theory-building, replication and corroboration.22
LARRY LAUDAN, BEYOND POSITIVISM AND RELATIVISM:  THEORY, METHOD AND 
EVIDENCE 22-23 (1996).
19 Rubin, “Law And”, supra note xx, at 526; Carl N. Edwards, In Search of Legal 
Scholarship:  Strategies for the Integration of Science into the Practice of Law, 8 S. 
CAL. INTERDISC. L.J. 1, 21 (1998). 
20 Lawrence M. Friedman, The Law and Society Movement, 38 STAN. L. REV.
763, 766 (1986).
21 Marcello Pera, In Praise of Cumulative Progress, in CHANGES AND PROGRESS 
IN MODERN SCIENCE 267, 267 (Joseph C. Pitt ed., 1985); Jan Beyea and Daniel 
Berger, Scientific Misconceptions Among Daubert Gatekeepers:  The Need for Reform 
of Expert Review Procedures, 64 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 327, 330-31 (2001).
22 Edwards, supra note xx, at 24; Nancy Levit, Listening to Tribal Legends:  An 
Essay on Law and Scientific Method, 58 FORDHAM L. REV. 263, 266-72 (1989).  See 
also Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals 509 U.S. 579, 590 (1993), where 
8Does legal scholarship “progress” in a manner akin to that attributed to 
scientific knowledge?  The possibility it does merits exploration since various 
attempts have been made to characterize the analysis of law in scientific terms.  
Perhaps the most ambitious effort to depict the legal system as a body of 
scientifically-deducible principles was pioneered by Christopher Columbus Langdell, 
Dean of Harvard Law School in the late 19th century.23  For Langdell and his 
disciples, law constituted an objective system defined by concrete, recurrent 
principles set down in decided cases.  Scientific enquiry proceeded by extracting rules 
from judicial rulings and law “progressed” when a jurist or scholar discovered a 
previously unarticulated principle that made sense of a body of case law. The rise of 
the academic treatise, where authors sought to rationalize and rethink entire areas of 
doctrine, was a significant by-product of this sort of legal science.24
By the 1920s, the scientific approach to law advocated by Langdell was 
becoming unfashionable since American legal academics were rebelling against what 
was felt to be an unduly stale and technocratic conception of the legal system.25
Ironically, those academics who turned the tide against Langdell’s intellectual project 
Justice Blackman observed that “(s)cience…is a process for proposing and refining 
theoretical explanations about the world that are subject to further testing and 
refinement….”   
23 On Langdell’s version of legal science, see Levit, supra note xx, at 275-77; 
NEIL DUXBURY, PATTERNS OF AMERICAN JURISPRUDENCE, 14-24 (1995); ANTHONY T. 
KRONMAN, THE LOST LAWYER:  FALLING IDEALS OF THE LEGAL PROFESSION 170-75 
(1993).
24 Robert W. Gordon, Lawyers, Scholars, and the “Middle Ground”, 91 MICH. 
L. REV. 2075, 2079-80 (1993); LAWRENCE  M. FRIEDMAN, AMERICAN LAW IN THE 
TWENTIETH CENTURY 490 (2002).   
9were themselves favorably disposed towards judicious use of scientific methodology.  
Langdell’s critics did not believe that law could be reduced to a set of internally 
consistent principles by the careful study of cases.  Many, however, were “legal 
realists” who were optimistic that the proper application of the methods of social 
science, particularly empirical analysis, could yield reveal “the reality” of law.26  The 
most potent contemporary variant of this line of reasoning comes from the field of law 
and economics.27  One argument those who advocate the use of economic analysis to 
study law have made is that their brand of scholarship facilitates the accumulation of 
knowledge in a scientific fashion since empirically disprovable hypotheses are being 
produced and tested.28
The scientific conception of law has had enduring appeal in other respects.29
In continental Europe, a strong belief that law is a system rather than merely a 
practical tool for structuring relations and solving conflicts underpins to this day a 
25 DUXBURY, PATTERNS, supra note xx at, 24-25, 36-37, 79; John Veilleux, The 
Scientific Model in Law, 75 GEO. L.J. 1967, 1977-78 (1987).   
26 KRONMAN, supra note xx, 195-201; MORTON J. HORWITZ, THE 
TRANSFORMATION OF AMERICAN LAW 1870-1960:  THE CRISIS OF LEGAL ORTHODOXY
209-11 (1992); Brian Leiter, Is There an “American” Jurisprudence?, 17 OXFORD J. 
OF LEGAL ST. 367, 377-78 (1997).
27 KRONMAN, supra note xx, 225-32, 240. 
28 Posner, Present, supra note xx, at 1121-22; Jason Scott Johnston, Law, 
Economics, and Post-Realist Explanation, 24 LAW & SOC’Y REV. 1217, 1231-32 
(1990); Jonathan R. Macey, Law and the Social Sciences, 21 HARV J. L. & PUB. 
POL’Y 171, 172-73 (1997).   
29 Posner, Present, supra note xx, at 1120-21; Darla L. Daniel, Of Deckchairs, 
Icebergs and Gestalt Shifts:  Unger, Kahn, and a Student of Contemporary Legal 
Thought, 72 U. COLO. L. REV. 851, 866-67 (2001). 
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strong faith in the idea of legal science.30  Also, despite the doubts cast upon 
Langdell’s approach to law, Anglo-American observers still sometimes make the case 
that the quality of legal scholarship and judicial decision-making would improve if 
academics and judges adopted scientific techniques and principles on a consistent and 
conscientious basis.31  Moreover, supported by pleas for more empirical legal 
scholarship, the production of research which uses statistical data to test defined 
hypotheses is on the rise.32  This latter trend has, in turn, led some to proclaim that the 
study of law is becoming more science-like.33
Still, while the notion that our understanding of law can be improved via the 
proper application of scientific method has had enduring appeal, the extent to which 
academic learning concerning law accumulates in a manner akin to scientific 
knowledge should be kept in perspective.  One caveat involves the cross-border 
communication of ideas.  With the physical and natural sciences, theory-building and 
theory-testing can occur through the medium of a transnational scholarly 
30 FRIEDMAN, AMERICAN, supra note xx, at 501; Franz Werro, Notes on the 
Purpose and Aims of Comparative Law, 75 TUL. L. REV. 1225, 1229 (2001).  Note, 
though, that equating the continental version of legal science with natural science is 
not entirely appropriate:  Fletcher, supra note xx, at 988-89.   
31 See, for example, Veilleux, supra note xx; Peter Ziegler, A General Theory of 
Law as a Paradigm for Legal Research, 51 MOD. L. REV. 569 (1988); Peter A. Alces, 
Contract Reconceived, 96 NW. U. L. REV. 39, 95-97 (2001).  
32 Michael Heise, The Past, Present, and Future of Empirical Legal Scholarship:  
Judicial Decision Making and the New Empricism, [2002] U. ILL. REV. 819, 821, 
824-26, 831.  
33 Thomas S. Ulen, A Nobel Prize in Legal Science:  Theory, Empirical Work, 
and the Scientific Method in the Study of Law, [2002] U. ILL. REV. 875, 909-10, 912-
16.
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community.34  This is because the subject matter of research (e.g. the prediction of 
earthquakes) conducted in a particular country will typically be understood by 
researchers everywhere and investigations which are conducted can generally be 
evaluated by experts around the world.  Matters are different with law, since legal 
scholars tend to write only about their own legal system and only for those acting 
within that system.35  Moreover, there are no globally accepted theories concerning 
the role of law and the functioning of the legal system, so even legal scholarship that 
is explicitly cross-border in orientation will necessarily have an audience that is to 
some degree jurisdictionally specific.36
Another important distinction between science and legal studies is that the 
method of enquiry typically differs.37  Scientists consciously seek to assimilate, verify 
and expand upon the work of others in the field.  In contrast, testing established 
theoretical constructs is not necessarily a core feature of legal scholarship.  Instead, it 
has a reactive quality, in the sense that the purpose often is to address timely issues 
arising on an ad hoc basis (e.g. a recent case or statutory enactment).
34 Id. at 894-95. 
35 Id., 895. 
36 Id.
37 Edwards, supra note xx, at 21-22; Rubin, Law And, supra note xx, at 550; 
Terence Daintith, Legal Research and Legal Value, 52 MOD. L. REV. 352, 357 
(1989); Todd D. Rakoff, Introduction, 115 HARV. L. REV. 1278, 1285-86 (2002).
12
Also important is that academic lawyers may have an explicitly normative 
inclination that is largely absent from the sciences.38  Scientists are not simply 
disinterested searchers for the truth but rather are individuals engaged in a human 
activity which can have an underlying social or political agenda.39  Nevertheless, the 
discourse of scientists is couched in value-free terms; good work within a particular 
field is that which accounts for observable phenomena.  In contrast, legal scholarship 
quite often akin is akin to advocacy, with the author critiquing court decisions or 
legislative policies with objective of putting the law at the service of an admired 
cause.40  As Edward Rubin, a US law professor, has said about law:  
“The entire field crackles with normativity, and it is this characteristic that
renders the scientific concept of validity so unhelpful as a basis for 
evaluation.”41
Or as John Kramer, another law professor, has frankly admitted with respect to his 
own scholarship:
38 Edwards, supra note xx, at 23-26; Rubin, Law And, supra note xx, at 524-28, 
542; Michael J. Graetz and Charles H. Whitbread, Monrad Paulsen and the Idea of a 
University Law School, 67 VA. L. REV. 445, 455 (1981). 
39 Tom Wilkie, Science is for Everyone, Whatever They Try to Tell You, 
INDEPENDENT, March 25, 1995, at 15. 
40 FRIEDMAN, AMERICAN, supra note xx, at 501; Roger C. Cramton, 
Demystifying Legal Scholarship, 75 GEO. L.J. 1, 6-8 (1986); Rebecca S. Eisenberg, 
The Scholar as Advocate, 43 J. LEGAL EDUC. 391, 394 (1993); Graham Brown, Should 
Law Professors Practice What They Teach?, 42 S. TEX. L. REV. 316, 335 (2001).   
41 Edward L. Rubin, On Beyond Truth:  A Theory for Evaluating Legal 
Scholarship, 80 CAL. L. REV. 889, 904 (1992). 
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“I did not pursue truth wherever it might lead.  I pursued more food stamps, 
less hunger (and) the end of the impoundment of funds for the Women, 
Infants, and Children feeding program”.42
To the extent that this attitude is prevalent generally among legal academics, it is 
unrealistic to expect legal scholarship to display the general pattern of cumulative 
knowledge so commonly associated with science.43
What about law and economics scholarship, with its scientific pretensions?  
Even here, it cannot be taken for granted that the academic literature meets the strict 
standards of verification and reliability associated with science.  Doubts exist about 
whether economics itself is a discipline where scientific methodology is properly 
invoked and knowledge accumulates.  In particular, economists stand accused of 
accepting and applying too readily the contestable assumption that economic behavior 
is the consequence of rational choices governed by self-interest.44  Correspondingly, 
claims that law and economics advances our understanding of legal topics in a 
scientific manner must remain at best controversial.45
42 John R. Kramer, Comment on Rebecca Eisenberg’s “The Scholar as 
Advocate”, 43 J. LEGAL EDUC. 401, 404 (1993). 
43 Rubin, Law And, supra note xx, at 540-41. 
44 JOHN PHEBY, METHODOLOGY AND ECONOMICS:  A CRITICAL INTRODUCTION
32-36 (1988); Daniel M. Hausman, Kuhn, Lakatos and the Character of Economics,
in NEW DIRECTIONS IN ECONOMIC METHODOLOGY 195, 208-10 (Roger E. Backhouse 
ed., 1994); Gregory S. Crespi, The Mid-Life Crisis of the Law and Economics 
Movement:  Confronting the Problems of Nonfalsifiability and Normative Bias, 67 
NOTRE DAME L. REV. 231, 232-33, 237-42 (1991).   
45 For examples of those who have cast doubt on the scientific credentials of law 
and economics, see Levit, supra note xx, at 282-85; Mark Cooney, Why is Economic 
Analysis So Appealing to Law Professors?, 45 STAN. L. REV. 2211, 2230 (1993); 
14
B. Paradigm Shifts:  Kuhn and Legal Scholarship
While the application of scientific methodology may well not be a hallmark of 
legal scholarship, even if it was, characterizing the evolution of academic writing on 
law in cumulative terms might still be inappropriate.  The reason is that the received 
wisdom concerning the development of scientific knowledge may be misconceived.  
The orthodox view is that our understanding of science accumulates by way of 
objective analysis founded on the safeguards of replication and corroboration.  In fact, 
however, even within the natural or physical sciences it cannot be taken for granted 
that there is “progress” towards the “truth” by reliance on “scientific method”.  This is 
because work done from an historical and sociological angle has cast doubt on the 
conventional wisdom concerning the accumulation of scientific knowledge.46
Thomas Kuhn has offered the most influential reappraisal of scientific 
endeavor through the invocation of terminology such as “paradigms” and “normal 
science”.47  Law has certainly not been immune from Kuhn’s influence; legal 
academics have on many occasions borrowed from his work to describe trends in the 
Mark V. Tushnet, Law, Science, and Law and Economics, 21 HARV J. L. & PUB. 
POL’Y 47, 51-52 (1997).  For a response, see Thomas S. Ulen, The Prudence of Law 
and Economics:  Why More Economics is Better, 26 CUMB. L. REV. 773, 788-93 
(1996). 
46 You Can’t Follow the Science Wars Without a Battle Map, ECONOMIST 
(London), December 11, 1997, at 109, 109-10.
47 Kuhn’s seminal work was THE STRUCTURE OF SCIENTIFIC REVOLUTIONS (3rd 
ed. 1996).  The book has sold more than a million copies since its initial publication 
and it has been described as “the most influential academic work of the second half of 
the twentieth century”:  Mark Blaug, Book Review, 33 HIST. POL. ECON. 855, 855 
(2001).   
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literature.48  It is appropriate, therefore to consider whether the trajectory of legal 
scholarship can be characterized appropriately in “Kuhnian” terms. 
According to Kuhn,49 within a given field, matters begin in a “preconsensus”, 
“immature” or “pre-paradigm” phase.50  This means there is competition between 
intellectual schools addressing the same issues from different, mutually incompatible 
standpoints.  The field subsequently comes together when work is produced that is 
sufficiently convincing to persuade members of existing schools to defect and to 
attract the next generation of academics.  Once a consensus is in place that is focused 
on the dominant “paradigm” or “disciplinary matrix”,51 researchers are spared the 
incessant and distracting re-examination of first principles.  Instead, they can proceed 
with confidence to solve “puzzles” by reference to the dominant mode of thought.52
48 To illustrate, a search of Westlaw’s “JLR” directory conducted in July 2003 
with the query “‘Thomas Kuhn’ & paradigm” yielded 555 documents.  This electronic 
database has wide coverage of U.S. law reviews extending back to the early 1980s.    
49 It is difficult to do justice to Kuhn’s work when summarizing it, in large part 
because Kuhn qualified many of his assertions after the first edition of THE 
STRUCTURE OF SCIENTIFIC REVOLUTIONS (1962).  On this pattern, see Blaug, Book 
Review, supra note xx, at 855.  For a thorough overview of Kuhn’s work, see PAUL 
HOYNINGEN-HEUNE, RECONSTRUCTING SCIENTIFIC REVOLUTIONS:  THOMAS S. 
KUHN’S PHILOSOPHY OF SCIENCE (1993).  For a succinct, if somewhat critical 
summary, see BRENDAN LARVOR, LAKATOS:  AN INTRODUCTION 37-44 (1998). 
50 KUHN, supra note xx, chapter 2. 
51 The shift away from the “paradigm” terminology to “disciplinary matrix” was 
an example of Kuhn qualifying his basic concepts as time progressed.  See KUHN, 
supra note xx, at 182; Blaug, Book Review, supra note xx, at 855.   
52 KUHN, supra note xx, chapter 4. 
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Such “mop-up work” within a “mature” field of research is known as “normal 
science”.53
Kuhn noted that those working in accordance with the precepts of “normal 
science” will periodically find inexplicable “anomalies” that are irreconcilable with 
the dominant paradigm.54  Over time, he said, an accumulation of serious anomalies 
can seriously destabilize the existing consensus and eventually build to a crisis.55  A 
fresh competition of ideas will then ensue that could either leave the existing 
paradigm intact or culminate in a “scientific revolution” that establishes a new 
consensus within the discipline.56  If a “paradigm shift” does occur, normal science 
will ultimately recommence under the new worldview, setting the stage for the cycle 
to repeat itself.57
According to Kuhn, such “paradigm shifts” do not yield the accumulation of 
knowledge in the manner traditionally associated with scientific progress.  Instead, 
since the preconceptions underlying successive traditions of normal science are 
radically different, discerning how the relevant paradigms are interrelated is highly 
problematic.  In other words, since comparative evaluation cannot be effected by a 
neutral, universal set of rules, disciplinary matrixes tend to be “incommensurable”.58
53 Id., chapter 3. 
54 Id., chapter 6. 
55 Id., chapter 7.  
56 Id. at 84.   
57 Id., chapters 10, 12. 
58 Id. at 102, 110, 112, 147-51.   
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Correspondingly, no a priori assumptions can be made as to whether a paradigm shift 
constitutes a move towards the “truth” in any objective sense.59  All that can be said is 
that the relevant academic community is working within an intellectual mindset that is 
addressing more successfully the issues deemed pertinent and topical.60
Kuhn’s argument that “progress” can be explained by reference to “normal 
science” and “paradigm shifts” proved infectious outside the realm of natural and 
physical sciences.61  For instance, social scientists have frequently discussed their own 
particular fields with reference to Kuhn’s insights.62  Also, politicians have drawn 
upon his ideas and even popular journalism is replete with references to 
“paradigms”.63  Hence, it should not be surprising that legal academics have relied on 
his theories to explain trends in legal scholarship.  It has been said, for instance, that 
“…the legal community, especially the legal academy, bears significant 
parallels to the scientific community as Kuhn describes it.  Both rely on 
standardized textbooks for initiation into the profession; both enjoy substantial 
59 Id. at 170-73, 206-7.  Kuhn developed his thoughts further in other published 
work.  For a summary, see HOYNINGEN-HEUNE, supra note xx, 263-64. 
60 While many have inferred from Kuhn’s work that one paradigm is just as good 
as another, it is open to question whether he believed this:  Ulen, Nobel, supra note 
xx, 885. 
61 Louis Menand, Undisciplined, WILSON Q., Autumn 2001, 51, 58-59. 
62 Esther-Mirjam Sent, Thomas Kuhn:  The Wrong Person at the Wrong Time, 63 
REV. POL. 390, 390 (2001).
63 Robert Fulford, Paradigm:  Putting the “P” Word in Perspective, GLOBE & 
MAIL, June 5, 1999, at D9; Wade Roush, Dwarf Standing on Giants, TECH. REV., 
Sept./Oct. 2000, 126 at 126. 
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insulation from the laity; both concern day-to-day puzzle solving; and both 
display quite similar internal communal structure.”64
Moreover, Kuhn’s notions of normal science, paradigms and so on have been relied 
upon to describe intellectual trends in a wide range of areas of the law, including 
contracts,65 immigration,66 civil procedure,67 and race relations.68
Despite the borrowing from Kuhn, it is open to question whether law is a 
context to which his approach can be fruitfully extended.  Kuhn himself generally 
sought to distance himself from efforts to use his work outside the scientific field69
and there is reason to believe that this sort of skepticism is appropriate with respect to 
64 Steven L. Winter, “Bull Durham” and the Uses of Theory, 42 STAN. L. REV. 
639, 670, n. 162 (1990).   
65 Alces, Contract, supra note xx, at 79-87. 
66 George A. Martinez, Race and Immigration Law:  A Paradigm Shift [2000] U. 
ILL. L. REV. 517.
67 Jeffrey W. Stempel, New Paradigm, Normal Science, or Crumbling 
Construct?  Trends in Adjudicatory Procedure and Litigation Reform, 53 BROOK. L. 
REV. 659 (1993).
68 Juan F. Perera, The Black/White Binary Paradigm of Race:  The “Normal 
Science” of American Racial Thought, 85 CAL. L. REV. 1213 (1997).  
69 Gordon McOuat, The Mistaken Gestalt of Science Studies:  Steve Fuller Takes 
on Kuhn, 36 CAN. J. HIST. 523, 523 (2001).  Kuhn himself said:
“I used to say that if you go through college in science and mathematics you 
may well get your bachelor’s degree without having been exposed to the 
Structure of Scientific Revolutions.  If you go through college in any other 
field you will read it at least once.  That was not altogether what I wanted 
(quoted in Blaug, Book Review, supra note xx at 855).” 
See also KUHN, supra note xx, at 208-9. 
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legal scholarship.70  We have seen that traditions such as explicit theory-building, 
empirical testing, replication and review seem to be lacking with legal scholarship.71
The discrepancies between scientific methodology and the study of law imply, in turn, 
that using what Kuhn had to say about science to understand legal scholarship better 
is a problematic leap in logic.72
Also noteworthy is that academic writing about law tends to have a strong 
normative and pragmatic dimension that is absent from scientific publications.73  To 
the extent that legal scholarship simply involves an interchange between those with 
differing opinions on foundational issues, legal studies seemingly lack the sort of 
consensus that marks out a “mature” field of research.  In other words, legal 
academics may not have moved beyond the “pre-paradigm” or “immature” phase and 
developed the tight research consensus required for “normal science”.74  If this is an 
accurate prognosis, then it is inappropriate to think about the evolution of legal 
scholarship in Kuhnian terms. 
C. Market Forces and Progress
70 Note, though, that Kuhn explicitly identified the use of precedent in judicial 
decisions as an example of paradigm elaboration: KUHN, supra note xx, at 23.
71 Supra note xx and accompanying text.  
72 Ziegler, supra note xx, at 573-74; Stempel, supra note xx, at 699.
73 Supra note xx and related discussion. 
74 Rubin, On Beyond, supra note xx, at 895-96; Daintith, supra note xx, at 356-
57; Charles W. Collier, Interdisciplinary Legal Scholarship in Search of a Paradigm, 
42 DUKE L.J. 840, 842-44 (1993) (noting, though, that legal scholarship in the U.S. 
may have formerly possessed a stable paradigm oriented around doctrinal analysis). 
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A contentious inference that can be drawn from Kuhn’s work is that science 
does not provide a platform for a move towards the “truth” in any objective sense.  
The concern in this instance is that the notion that successive scientific theories are 
incommensurable lends support to a corrosive form of “anything goes” relativism.75
A debate influenced by the same intellectual dynamics has occurred in relation to 
legal scholarship, with the result being much heated discussion about whether the 
“quality” of what is published can be evaluated in accordance with any sort of neutral 
criteria.76  Regardless, at this point parallels that might be drawn between academic 
writing on law on the one hand and scientific methodology or Kuhn’s work on the 
other will be set to one side.77  Instead, there will now be analysis of why academic 
writing about law, despite shaky scientific credentials, might still “progress”.  
It must be acknowledged that, in the present context, the possibility of 
meaningful improvement over time cannot be taken for granted.  Instead, so long as 
debates about relativism remain unresolved, presuming that legal scholarship can 
actually become “better” is an inherently contentious step to take.  To move the 
analysis forward, however, we will assume that meaningful distinctions can in fact be 
75 See LAUDAN, supra note xx, 8-9, 14-17 (1996); ECONOMIST, supra note xx, at 
110.  For more background on charges of relativism and Kuhn’s response, see 
HOYNIGEN-HEUNE, supra note xx, 259-64. 
76 Rubin, On Beyond, supra note xx; Joseph W. Singer, The Player and the 
Cards:  Nihilism and Legal Theory, 94 YALE L.J. 1, 33-35 (1984); John S. Elson, The 
Case Against Legal Scholarship or, If the Professor Must Publish, Must the 
Profession Perish, 39 J. LEGAL EDUC. 343, 356-57, 362-64 (1989).   
77 These topics can properly be set aside together.  This is because, if it is 
inappropriate to think of legal scholarship in Kuhnian terms, debates about relativism 
within the scientific realm become largely irrelevant to legal scholarship.  See Ernest 
J. Weinrib, Legal Formalism:  On the Immanent Rationality of Law, 97 YALE L.J. 
949, 964 (1988). 
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made on the basis of criteria such as “quality” or “truth”.78  For our purposes, then, 
there is scope for progress within legal scholarship.  What might drive matters in this 
direction if scientific methodology is not invoked on a systematic basis?  An answer 
worth considering is that market-oriented dynamics act as the catalyst for a move 
towards “better” legal scholarship.79
Essentially, the hypothesis under analysis here is that a beneficial competition 
among alternatives occurs in a legal scholarship market, thus yielding an improved 
understanding of law.80  Legal scholar Herbert Hovenkamp has said of economics:
“The market for economic ideas is no different from the market for products 
or services.  When a demand appears, someone will try to supply it, from 
whatever source.81
Perhaps the same occurs with legal scholarship.82
78 This follows the approach adopted by Kissam, Evaluation, supra note xx, at 
254-55.  Still, it must be acknowledged that the working assumption is a somewhat 
heroic one, since entire volumes have been devoted to ascertaining the precise content 
of “truth”.  See, for example, RICHARD CAMPBELL, TRUTH AND HISTORICITY (1992).  
79 On the more general proposition that the operation of market forces can yield 
progress, see VAN DOREN, supra note xx, 95-97; NISBET, supra note xx, 187-93, 299 
(focusing primarily on the work of Adam Smith).   
80 See George L. Priest, The Growth of Interdisciplinary Research and the 
Industrial Structure of the Production of Legal Ideas:  A Reply to Judge Edwards, 91 
MICH. L. REV. 1929, 1940-42 (1993); Robert C. Ellickson, The Market for “Law-
And” Scholarship, 21 HARV J. L. & PUB POL’Y 157, 164-70 (1997); Erwin 
Chereminsky and Catherine Fisk, In Defense of the Big Tent:  The Importance of 
Recognizing the Many Audiences for Legal Scholarship, 34 TULSA L.J. 667, 675-76 
(1999).
81 HERBERT HOVENKAMP, ENTERPRISE AND AMERICAN LAW, 1836-1937, 346 
(1991). 
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To elaborate, with a conventional market for products or services, there are 
forces of supply and demand.  With respect to legal scholarship, the “supply side” 
consists of researchers who write about law.  The “demand side” is composed of those 
who “consume” what is written, such as legal academics, editors of law reviews, legal 
publishers, practicing lawyers, law students and judges.  The suppliers in the legal 
scholarship market have various incentives to produce “quality” academic work.83
These include the prospect of job security (tenure), nonpecuniary rewards (peer 
esteem and satisfaction derived from influencing changes in the law),84 and financial 
benefits (increased royalties, better job offers and enhanced consulting opportunities).  
Consumers, for their part, can discipline suppliers in various ways.  
Manuscripts submitted for publication can be accepted or rejected.85  Books can be 
purchased or left to sit on the shelves.  “Quality” publications can be cited with 
approval in print or discussed favorably as part of hiring or promotion exercises.86
82 For background, see sources cited supra note xx as well as George L. Priest, 
Triumphs or Failings of Modern Legal Scholarship and the Conditions of its 
Production, 63 U. COL. L. REV. 725 (1992). 
83 See Lasson, supra note xx, at 948-49; Chereminsky and Fisk, supra note xx, at 
677-78.
84
“(V)anity is the occupational disease of the academic”:  David Luban, Legal 
Scholarship as a Vocation, 51 J. LEGAL EDUC. 167, 171 (2001) (quoting Max Weber).  
85 The criteria applied will vary depending on the intended audience:  Banks 
McDowell, The Audience for Legal Scholarship, 40 J. LEGAL EDUC. 261, 266-68 
(1990).   
86 Note, though, that consumer preferences in the legal scholarship market are 
not homogeneous:  Michael D. McClintock, The Declining Use of Legal Scholarship 
by Courts:  An Empirical Study, 51 OKLA. L. REV. 659, 686-87 (1998).  
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Finally, sloppy work or misguided intellectual frolics can be criticized or simply 
ignored.87
There certainly are those who believe that market discipline has caused legal 
scholarship to improve and progress over time.88  Still, potential flaws with the market 
for legal scholarship, such as it is, must be acknowledged.89  For instance, concerns 
have been raised that outside consulting and the underwriting of research by special 
interest groups diminish the objectivity of law professors and correspondingly have a 
corrupting influence on the quality of legal scholarship.90  Moreover, there is a risk 
that once academics have completed whatever probationary period they must serve 
before becoming permanent members of a faculty and are otherwise content with their 
current status in the job market, they will lack meaningful incentives to produce 
scholarship of a high standard.91  On the other hand, empirical evidence on the impact 
of the awarding of tenure on academic productivity indicates that implicit incentives 
87 On the high percentage of articles in U.S. law reviews which are unread, see 
Gava, supra note xx, at 458-60; Rhode, supra note xx, at 1331. 
88 See sources cited infra notes xx to xx as well as Robert W. Gordon, Lawyers, 
Scholars, and the “Middle Ground”, 91 MICH. L. REV. 2075 (1993); Richard A. 
Posner, The Deprofessionalization of Legal Teaching and Scholarship, 91 MICH. L. 
REV. 1921, 1925 (1993).  
89 Sunstein, supra note xx, at 1254; Bruce A. Ackerman, The Marketplace of 
Ideas, 90 YALE L.J. 1131, 1139-40 (1981).  
90 Eisenberg, Scholar, supra note xx, Richard B. Schmitt, Rules May Require 
Law Professors to Disclose Fees, WALL ST. J., Jan. 31, 2000, at B1; Richard Lippitt, 
Intellectual Honesty, Industry and Interest Sponsored Professorial Works, and Full 
Disclosure:  Is the Viewpoint Earning the Money, or is the Money Earning the 
Viewpoint?, 47 WAYNE L. REV. 1075, 1081-85, 1094-95 (2001).
91 Zimmerman, Law, supra note xx, at 692; David L. Gregory, The Assault on 
Scholarship, 32 WM. & MARY L. REV. 993, 996-7, 1001 (1991).  
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such as the desire to retain the respect of peers may operate as a sufficient check 
against “slacking”.92
Turning to the demand side, there again are potential flaws with the market.  
For instance, consumers of academic work may be too busy to evaluate the product 
properly.  Also, law review editors and publishers will not always have the expertise 
required to detect quality.93  Moreover, even if those choosing what will appear in 
print are knowledgeable, they may lack incentives to take seriously the priorities of 
those who actually read legal scholarship.  For instance, the fact that most of 
America’s law reviews receive hefty subsidies from their host schools means that for 
the students who edit these journals catering to the preferences of the potential 
audience does not have to be the top priority.94
Whatever the precise cause, the “end product” does have strong critics.  Some 
wonder, for instance, if legal scholarship “is at best an other-worldly irrelevance and 
at worst a radical and doomed narcissism”.95  Others dismiss much of “what passes 
for legal ‘research’…as antediluvian”.96  In the United States, at least, student-run law 
92 Si Li and Hui Ou-Yang, Incentives, Performance, and Academic Tenure, 
unpublished working paper (2003) (providing data indicating that the number of 
publications and number of citations generated by economists at leading American 
universities is much the same both before and after tenure).    
93 Ellickson, Market, supra note xx, at 169 (raising the possibility to cast doubt 
upon it).   
94 Rhode, supra note xx, at 1356; Priest, Triumphs, supra note xx, at 726-29.   
95 Peter Goodrich, Of Blackstone’s Tower:  Metaphors of Distance and Histories 
of the English Law School, in WHAT ARE LAW SCHOOLS FOR? 59, 66 (Peter B.H. 
Birks, ed., 1996).
96 FRIEDMAN, supra note xx, at 493.  
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reviews are primary targets for critics of legal scholarship.  For instance, there 
allegedly are too many articles published,97 though defenders of the journals say this 
is an unavoidable price associated with the production of legal scholarship which is of 
high quality.98   Moreover, the output is regularly chastised for an absence of 
eloquence and elegance, unnecessary length and documentation, a lack of originality 
and excessive insularity.99 The upshot is that a market for legal scholarship can 
potentially foster quality output but it remains open to question whether the forces of 
supply and demand are potent enough to ensure that “progress” is the dominant 
outcome. 
D. Intellectual Cycles
To this point, we have seen that legal scholarship can potentially be 
characterized as the accumulation of knowledge, as the subject matter of “paradigms” 
and as the product of an intellectual marketplace.  On the other hand, there is reason 
to believe that the evolution of academic writing on law cannot be accounted for 
purely in terms of models appropriate for scientific literature and is not necessarily the 
product of a beneficial interaction of forces of supply and demand.  Correspondingly, 
97 Gava, supra note xx, at 461, 465; Rhode, supra note xx, at 1331; Neil 
Duxbury, When Trying is Failing:  Holmes’s “Englishness”, 63 BROOK. L. REV. 145, 
149-50 (1997).  Not everyone agrees.  See, for example, Gregory, Assault, supra note 
xx, at 998.
98 Posner, Deprofessionalization, supra note xx, at 1928 (making this 
observation while characterizing the production of legal scholarship in sociobiological 
terms). 
99 See, for example, Lasson, supra note xx, at 942-48; Rhode, supra note xx, at 
1333-36, 1339-42; Zimmerman, supra note xx, at 677-81, 689-90; FRIEDMAN, supra
note xx, at 497-99.  For an overview of the criticisms leveled against American law 
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it is appropriate to consider additional factors that might govern the trajectory of legal 
scholarship.  A possibility that merits consideration is a cyclical dimension.  The idea 
is that, to at least some degree, the academic analysis of legal issues constitutes a 
continuing conversation about pivotal questions.100  As Neil Duxbury, a U.K. 
academic, has observed in a book on trends in American jurisprudence:
“Ideas – along with values, attitudes and beliefs – tend to emerge and 
sometimes they are revived and refined.  But rarely do we see them born or 
die.  History is not quite like that.” 101
The possibility that legal scholarship has a cyclical quality has been 
acknowledged in various contexts.  Some observations on the point relate to general 
trends.  For instance, Duxbury says the received wisdom concerning American legal 
thought is that there has been a pendulum swing back and forth between “formalistic” 
analysis (e.g. the legal science associated with Langdell and the policy-oriented Legal 
Process school of the 1950s and 1960s) and “realistic” views (e.g. the “legal realism” 
that supplanted “Langdellism” and the critical legal studies movement of the 
1980s).102  Also, in a 1993 law review article entitled “Plus ça Change”, Paul Brest 
said that
reviews, see Richard S. Harnsberger, Reflections About Law Reviews and Legal 
Scholarship, 76 NEB. L. REV. 681, 687-91, 701-3 (1997). 
100 Gava, supra note xx, at 446. 
101 DUXBURY, supra note xx, at 2-3. 
102 Id. at 2-3.
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“(t)aking everything into account, a law student who fell asleep in 1963 and 
awoke in 1993 would not be astonished by his new surrounds.  If he had fallen 
asleep holding a law review – the soporific power was no weaker in those 
days – the nature and language of some of the articles would bewilder him, 
but he would find much that is familiar”.103
The same point of view has been echoed in relation to particular aspects of 
law.  Lawrence Friedman, a founder of the interdisciplinary approach to law known as 
the law and society movement, has said that with it “(t)he work does not, in general, 
build or grow; it travels in cycles and circles, round and round”.104  With respect to 
law and economics, Mark Tushnet observed in a 1998 article entitled “Everything Old 
is New Again” that a “new Chicago school” that focuses on the relation between 
informal social conventions (“norms”) and law is an unintentional intellectual 
descendant from venerable traditions in sociology and anthropology.105  David 
Kennedy, an international law academic, referred in an article published in 2000 to a 
“pendulum movement” in his discipline and said that “(f)or the past hundred and more 
years, the modes of both criticism and reform have remained remarkably stable”.106
Similarly, David Clark, a comparative lawyer, said of his field in 2001 that 
“(a)lthough comparative law research has spread to countries in which it did not exist 
103 Paul Brest, Plus ça Change, 91 MICH. L. REV. 1945, 1950 (1993).  
104 Lawrence M. Friedman, The Law and Society Movement, 38 STAN. L. REV. 
763, 766 (1986).  For background on the law and society movement and Friedman’s 
contribution to it, see DUXBURY, supra note xx, at 440-45. 
105 Mark Tushnet, “Everything Old is New Again”:  Early Reflections on the 
“New Chicago School” [1998] WISC. L. REV. 579, 579, 584-85.
106 Kennedy, supra note xx, at 340, 376.   
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in 1900, and the diversity and quality of writing has improved, the basic ideas were 
already in place a century ago”.107
Though Clark acknowledged that comparative law scholarship improved in 
certain respects during the 20th century, the notion that the trajectory of ideas is 
cyclical has a distinctly pessimistic connotation.  Essentially, the possibility of linear 
advancement seems largely foreclosed if a “rise and fall” pattern predominates.108
Answers to perennial questions may admittedly differ over time.  Still, this does not 
mean there has been “progress”.  Instead, as part of a pendulum-like movement, a 
mode of thought that is dominant at a particular point in time might simply be a 
candidate for replacement by its polar opposite.    
Is such pessimism justified with legal scholarship?  Academic debates about 
law often do have a recurrent dimension.  Still, is it true that there is “nothing new 
under the sun”?109  It seems unlikely.  One consideration is what former British Prime 
Minister Harold Macmillan referred to as “events, dear boy, events”.110  With 
academic disciplines oriented to foundational texts, such as philosophy and literature, 
107 David S. Clark, Nothing New in 2000?  Comparative Law in 1900 and Today, 
75 TUL. L. REV., 871, 894 (2001).
108 VAN DOREN, supra note xx, at 21-22, 113-14; Birnhack, Idea, supra note xx, at 
9.  There is a more pessimistic alternative – regression – which is not considered here.  
On “theories of regress”, see VAN DOREN, supra note xx, at 114-16, 119-21. 
109 On the link between this phrase and a cyclical trajectory of ideas, see VAN 
DOREN, supra note xx, at 114.
110 For one of the many of sources citing the quote, see John Willman, Turning 
Back the Hands of Time, FIN. TIMES (London), October 19, 2002, FT Weekend, at 4.   
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there inevitably will be some tendency to revisit issues previously explored.111  On the 
other hand, with legal studies, the topics for debate are unlikely to remain entirely 
fixed and constant since law evolves in response to changing social circumstances.  
Academics, in turn, are placed under an onus to adjust since good timing is often a 
core attribute of successful legal scholarship.112  Correspondingly, when there is a 
major change to the law, or an entirely new field of legal regulation emerges, the 
parameters for debate necessarily shift.    
Even if current events are taken out of the equation, it still remains open to 
question whether legal scholarship has a strongly cyclical dynamic.  For instance, 
with the trajectory of American legal thought, Duxbury has explicitly challenged the 
pendulum swing account.113  Indeed, doubts have in fact been cast on whether there 
are any serious proponents of this version of history.114  Moreover, Brest’s “plus ça 
change, plus ça meme chose” appraisal of the academic study of law in the concluding 
decades of the 20th century is not shared universally.  Some have argued that, because 
of a shift away from doctrinal work in favor of interdisciplinary analysis, there was a 
net decline in the social value of legal scholarship.115  Others, however, think that the 
111 Still, progress arguably can occur even in such fields.  See, for example, VAN 
DOREN, supra note xx, at 331-32.
112 Jim Chen and David Schultz, Force Majeure in Legal Scholarship, 14 CONST. 
COMMENT. 427, 428 (1997).  
113 DUXBURY, supra note xx, at 2-3. 
114 Brian Leiter, Is There an “American” Jurisprudence?, 17 OXFORD J. LEGAL 
STUD. 367, 372 (1997).
115 See, for example, Harry T. Edwards, The Growing Disjunction Between Legal 
Education and the Legal Profession 91 MICH. L. REV. 34 (1992) (as characterized by 
Posner, Deprofessionalization, supra note xx, at 1925).  
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switch in emphasis was a distinct improvement.  For instance, a Canadian law 
professor observed in 1986 that “(l)egal scholarship has changed dramatically in this 
century” and “has dramatically increased what we know about the way law actually 
works”.116  A leading US legal academic offered the same verdict a few years later:
“The last quarter century has been a golden age for American legal 
scholarship.  We have seen a profusion of scholarly publication whose range, 
ambition and quality is without compare in the history of American law 
schools.”117
Similar sentiments have been expressed to particular subject areas.  For 
instance, while some comparative lawyers worry that the core ideas in the field have 
been around for decades, others are more upbeat.  As the president of the International 
Academy of Comparative Law observed in 2001
“Methods have been refined, instruments have been developed, courses are 
being continuously expanded and reconsidered – all this in the service of a 
better comparative law.”118
Tort law is another area where there has been optimism.  By the late 1990s 
116 John Hagan, The New Legal Scholarship:  Problems and Prospects, 1 CAN. J. 
L. & SOC. 35, 35, 37 (1986).
117 John H. Langbein, Scholarly and Professional Objectives in Legal Education:  
American Trends and English Comparisons in WHAT (Birks), supra note xx, 1, at 6.  
See also David E. Van Zandt, American Jurisprudence, 1870-1970:  a History, by 
James E. Herget (Book Review), 28 HOUS. L. REV. 965, 965 (1991) (“American legal 
scholarship is vibrant”).   
118 K.D. Kerameus, Comparative Law and Comparative Lawyers:  Opening 
Remarks, 75 TUL. L. REV. 865, 870 (2001). 
31
“leading torts scholars (were) looking back with a sense of accomplishment on 
a generation ‘marked by a variety of highly ambitious scholarly 
developments’, namely the increasingly sophisticated economic and corrective 
justice theories that comprise modern tort theory”.119
Shifting from individual subject areas to particular approaches that can be 
adopted to study law, optimists can again be found.  It has been said, for instance, that 
“(w)ithin the legal academy, the achievements of feminism have been substantial and 
cumulative”.120  Moreover, Richard Epstein, a leading law and economics scholar, has 
expressed concerns about the future of the discipline but still argues that for a number 
of decades “the rate of intellectual return on relatively straightforward problems was 
exceedingly high.”121  The upshot is that there appears to be more to legal scholarship 
than the plot in the movie “Groundhog Day”, in which Bill Murray was condemned to 
wake up each day and find that it was yesterday all over again.
E. Academic Fads and Fashions 
In the foregoing section, a characteristic uniting the academics who were cited 
to cast doubt on the cyclical account of legal scholarship was that they were offering 
an appraisal of the field that implied things were getting “better”.  Still, even if legal 
119 Virginia Nolan and Edmund Ursin, The Deacademification of Tort Theory, 48 
U. KAN. L. REV. 59, 59 (1999) (quoting an American Association of Law Schools 
pamphlet but arguing that the sense of accomplishment is misplaced).  
120 Ngaire Naffine, In Praise of Legal Feminism, 22 LEGAL STUD. 71, 71 (2002).  
121 Richard A. Epstein, Law and Economics:  Its Glorious Past and Cloudy 
Future, 64 U. CHI. L. REV. 1167, 1172 (1997).  For a similar verdict, see Thomas S. 
Ulen, Firmly Grounded:  Economics in the Future of Law, [1997] WISCONSIN L. REV. 
433, 434, 463. 
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scholarship does not evolve simply by reference to the past, does this mean that 
“progress” is inevitable?  Work done by law professor Cass Sunstein on fads, fashions 
and academic “cascades” indicates the answer is no. 
Sunstein subscribes to the notion that there is a market for legal scholarship 
with academics constituting the producers and consumers including other academics, 
students, government officials and judges.122  He doubts, however, whether the forces 
of supply and demand yield beneficial outcomes in this context.123  Skepticism about 
the market for legal scholarship is, as we have seen, not novel.124  Sunstein does more, 
however, than suggest there is a case of market failure.  Instead, he draws upon social 
science literature on fads and fashions to suggest how academic writing about law 
might evolve.  
To understand the argument Sunstein is making, some background is required.  
Typically, when economists model markets they assume that parties have full 
information about all relevant circumstances.  In the real world, however, people are 
not in this position.  A way they can compensate is to learn by observing the actions 
of others.  Correspondingly, when members of a group are cognizant of each other’s 
behavior, they can often end up making the same choices.  This sort of “herd 
behavior” can create a “cascade” that yields a “fad”.125  The decisions of an individual 
122 Sunstein, Foreword, supra  note xx, at 1253. 
123 Id. at 1251-52, 1264.  
124 Supra note xx to xx and related discussion. 
125 On cascades and related behavior, see Sushil Bikhchandani et al., Learning 
from the Behavior of Others:  Conformity, Fads, and Informational Cascades, 12 J. 
ECON. PERSP. 151 (1998); David Hirshleifer, Informational Cascades and Social 
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with a reputation for being well-informed – a “fashion leader” – can exaggerate the 
behavior in question.126
An important aspect of cascades is that, because they are based on weak 
information, the conformist behavior involved can occur when the initial choice was 
poor.  Admittedly, if there is a cascade based around an erroneous premise, the 
dissemination of pertinent and persuasive conflicting information can operate as a 
corrective.127  Still, the relevant facts may never become fully available so a reversal 
cannot be taken for granted.  
Sunstein has extended the learning on cascades, fads and so on to the context 
of legal scholarship.128  He argues that academic lawyers typically lack reliable 
information about what is “true” or “right”.129  As a result, the signals that provide the 
foundation for fads can be influential within the legal academy.130  He argues that the 
effect is reinforced because legal academics are concerned about their reputations and 
thus are cautious about defying a consensus adopted by respected peers.131  Also 
Conventions in 2 THE NEW PALGRAVE DICTIONARY OF ECONOMICS AND THE LAW 300 
(Peter Newman ed., 1998); ROBERT J. SHILLER, IRRATIONAL EXUBERANCE (2000), 
chapter 8.   
126 Bikhchandani et al., Learning , supra note xx, at 160; Hirshleifer, supra note 
xx, at 302.   
127 Hirshleifer, supra note xx, at 301, 303. 
128 Academia had previously been identified as an environment where the 
literature seemed relevant:  Hirshleifer, supra note xx, at 305.   
129 Sunstein, supra note xx, at 1254.
130 Id. at 1254-56. 
131 Id. at 1256-58.  This is known as a “reputational cascade”.  See Robert C. 
Ellickson, The Market for Social Norms, 3 AM. L. & ECON. REV. 1, 26 (2001).  
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significant is that a new line of thinking can coalesce around views adopted by a like-
minded group which moves collectively via mutual self-reinforcement towards an 
extreme position (“group polarization”).132  This process can, in turn, provide an ideal 
platform for “fashion leaders” to act as “polarization entrepreneurs” who amplify 
informational signals via the medium of a supportive network of followers.133
Sunstein admits that some fads “burn out” quickly because, once the relevant 
points have been raised, little can be done with them.134  Others, he says, can be 
displaced by external shocks, such as changes in the political climate or major 
innovations in related fields.135  What about fads that endure?  Does longevity mean 
that the relevant ideas are “good” or “true”?  According to Sunstein, no.  He 
acknowledges that cogent arguments and contradictory evidence can puncture a 
misguided set of claims.  Still, so long as faulty informational signals, reputational 
concerns and “group polarization” continue to fortify a particular fad, bad ideas can 
enjoy considerable longevity.136
Sunstein, by applying the literature on cascades to legal scholarship, has 
articulated in a systematic fashion sentiments expressed by some others.  Roger 
Younger scholars do have an incentive to discover novel approaches, but arguably the 
legal academy’s reward structure requires that their elders can appreciate the 
innovative move as continuing a tradition with which the elders are associated.  See 
Tushnet, Everything Old, supra note xx, at 581.    
132 Sunstein, supra note xx, at 1258-60. 
133 Id. at 1260-61.  
134 Id. at 1263. 
135 Id. at 1261-62.
136 Id. at 1263-64. 
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Cramton, an American legal academic, has suggested that “(s)cholarship, perhaps 
more than other facets of legal culture, is responsive to fashions”.137  William 
Twining, an English legal scholar, has observed that 
“it is not unknown within jurisprudence for a book-of-the moment, a robust 
debate, or some dramatic event to attract the ad hoc attention of swarms of 
jurists like moths to a flame.”138
Duxbury has said more generally that American legal scholarship is “characterized 
increasingly by faddishness” and has argued that “American legal theorists are 
nothing if not slaves to fashion”.139
For the sake of argument, let us assume fads do influence legal scholarship.  
Does this mean that Sunstein’s premise that mistaken ideas can easily become both 
influential and durable must be accepted as well?  The answer is no.  Certainly 
Twining does not accept that fads necessarily yield deleterious consequences.  
Instead, he says that “(i)f fashion…or intellectual snobbery have produced some 
imbalances or distortions within legal theory, these are faults which are quite easily 
corrected.”140  Twining does not elaborate on how precisely this might occur.  
Presumably, though, he was assuming that fads are fragile since subsequent 
intellectual discourse will reveal the faulty nature of the ideas initially advanced.  
137 Cramton, Demystifying, supra note xx, at 14.   
138 William Twining, Academic Law and Legal Philosophy:  The Significance of 
Herbert Hart, 95 LAW Q. REV. 557, 569 (1979). 
139 Neil Duxbury, History as Hyperbole, 15 OXF. J. LEGAL STUD. 477, 487 
(1995). 
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Twining, then, is a “cascade optimist” who has faith in the presence of corrective 
forces that will spring into action when things have gone badly off the track.  
Sunstein, on the other hand, seems to be a “cascade pessimist” who doubts whether 
faulty academic fads will be shattered by the dissemination of new information.141
Offering a definitive assessment of the durability of faulty intellectual 
cascades is not possible at this juncture since even Sunstein has acknowledged that his 
“informal and anecdotal” analysis is only intended to operate as a platform for further 
discussion.142  Nevertheless, it is possible to identify a factor which could be relevant, 
this being the extent to which legal scholarship circulates in a “closed” or “open” 
network.143  Again, an intellectual bandwagon built upon the “wrong” outcome will 
tend to be fragile since the release of new data or ideas can expose the erroneous 
underpinning of the fad.144  Correspondingly, a misguided legal scholarship cascade 
should be more vulnerable when there is a broadly-based audience with a wide range 
of expertise than when the relevant field is a small, specialized and insulated.  
The network in which legal scholarship circulates can open in various 
directions.  There can, for instance, be exchanges between those specializing in 
different areas of the law or dialogue between legal scholars and academics working 
140 Twining, Academic, supra note xx, at 570. 
141 The optimism/pessimism terminology is borrowed from Ellickson, Market, 
supra note xx, 35 (discussing “norm optimists” and “norm pessimists”).  
142 Sunstein, Foreword, supra  note xx, at 1252-53. 
143 On the effect which open vs. closed networks can have on the quality of legal 
scholarship, see Posner, Legal Scholarship, supra note xx, at 1325.   
144 Supra note xx and related discussion.    
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in other disciplines which offer insights directly pertinent to the analysis of legal 
topics.  With respect to correcting misguided fads, however, perhaps the most 
promising possibility is interchange between law professors and those who work with 
the law in a practical setting (e.g. lawyers, judges and government officials dealing 
with legal issues).  
Consider, for instance, the analysis of the international law field offered by 
David Kennedy in a 2000 article.145  Applying the terminology used here, he qualifies 
as a “cascade optimist”.  This is because he says that ideas in international law which 
are useful will be picked up and may contribute to a new disciplinary consensus and 
those which are not will be left to one side.146  He says the primary reason for this 
outcome is that legal practitioners who deal with international law issues assess the 
persuasiveness and ultimate value of academic work.  He describes the discipline they 
exercise as follows:
“(W)hen practitioner-beings assess things, they do so with their eyes wide 
open, unaffected by the fashions and egos that befuddle scholars.  Their focus 
is relentlessly on the real world where the rubber meets the road, and it is their 
judgment, or predictions about their judgment, that guarantees the pragmatism 
and political neutrality of the field’s development.”147
Richard Posner has made related suggestions with respect to interdisciplinary 
legal scholarship dealing with moral philosophy and bankruptcy law.  He argues that 
145 Kennedy, supra note xx. 
146 Id. at 398.   
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with legally-oriented debates on moral philosophy “quality control” is likely to be a 
serious problem.  This is because “a law professor’s article on Hegelian 
jurisprudence” might only be read by “other law professors interested in Continental 
philosophy” with “no leakage outside that narrow network”.148
Posner is more optimistic about bankruptcy law, where the mathematically 
oriented analysis of choice known as game theory has strongly influenced leading 
interdisciplinary scholars in the field.149  He acknowledges that a practicing lawyer 
would not consult articles on bankruptcy law that apply such an exotic approach.  On 
the other hand, “treatise writers and other bankruptcy scholars read (this literature) 
and (incorporate) their insights into their own, practitioner-friendly works….”150  The 
result is that, as with international law, “practitioner beings” ultimately are part of the 
feedback loop.  Correspondingly, to the extent that open vs. closed networks do 
indeed affect the durability of misguided academic fads, a mistaken cascade should be 
more durable in the area of moral philosophy than with bankruptcy law.  
The notion that a misguided legal scholarship fad will be more vulnerable if 
there is an active dialogue between academics and practitioners is consistent with a 
broader thesis, namely that the quality of academic writing on law will be better if law 
147 Id. at 399. 
148 Posner, Legal Scholarship, supra note xx, at 1325-26.   
149 For examples, see THOMAS H. JACKSON, THE  LOGIC AND LIMITS OF 
BANKRUPTCY LAW 11-16, 29-31, 57-63 (1986); Alan Schwartz, Bankruptcy Workouts 
and Debt Contracts, 36 J.L. & ECON. 595 (1992). 
150 Posner, Legal Scholarship, supra note xx, at 1326. 
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professors seek consciously to relate their work to the “real world”.151  The belief on 
this count is that “(p)ure scholars may be more inclined to espouse views that are 
fanciful, extreme, or otherwise ungrounded in reality”.152  The proposition, however, 
that the quality of legal scholarship is “better” when academic writing has a strong 
practical dimension does not command universal acceptance.  One counter-argument 
is that legal academics with well-developed professional connections will be 
influenced by client preferences, rather than saying what they think “without fear or 
favor”.153  Another is that a law professor with tight links to the legal profession will 
have neither the time nor the inclination to undertake the sort of writing that 
challenges the premises underlying traditional legal analysis.154  Ultimately, then, 
even if academic fads are less likely to endure in fields where academics engage in 
ongoing dialogue with practitioners, it cannot be taken for granted that the quality of 
scholarship will be higher. 
F. Conclusion
151 Rakoff, Introduction, supra note xx, at 1286-87; Judith S. Kaye, One Judge’s 
View of Academic Law Review Writing, 39 J. LEGAL EDUC. 313, 318-21 (1989); Jean 
R. Sternlight, Symbiotic Legal Theory and Legal Practice:  Advocating a Common 
Sense Jurisprudence of Law and Practical Applications, 50 U. MIAMI L. REV. 707, 
772-75 (1996).  Cf. Tamar Frankel, Of Theory and Practice, 77 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 5, 
14-16, 24-28 (2001) (arguing that it will be beneficial for theorists to think in practical 
terms but stressing that successful implementation cannot be taken for granted 
because theorists inevitably will have different goals than practitioners). 
152 Brown, Should Law, supra note xx, at 334.
153 Eisenberg, Scholar, supra note xx, at 393.   
154 Ackerman, Marketplace, supra note xx, at 1135-37; Meir Dan-Cohen, 
Listeners and Eavesdroppers:  Substantive Legal Theory and its Audience, 63 U. 
COLO. L. REV. 569, 586-88 (1992).  
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We have now considered a series of potential trajectories for legal scholarship.  
Each has a certain plausibility.  The idea that our knowledge of the legal system can 
accumulate by the proper application of scientific method has had enduring appeal.  
On numerous occasions, intellectual trends relating to law have been described in 
Kuhnian terms. It is possible to draw analogies from the conventional economic 
analysis of markets to offer an optimistic prognosis for legal scholarship.  There have 
been pendulum swings in the academic literature on law, which implies that there may 
be “nothing new under the sun”.  Finally, the fact that legal academics cannot possibly 
be fully aware of what might be “right” or “true” means that the field is susceptible to 
fads.  
At the same time, no single account of the manner in which legal scholarship 
evolves is fully convincing.  To illustrate, the fact that much academic writing about 
law is akin to advocacy means it is inappropriate to equate legal scholarship fully with 
either the received wisdom concerning natural sciences or Kuhn’s recharacterization 
of scientific endeavor.  Moreover, while it may be accurate to say that there is a 
market for legal scholarship, the manner in which the forces of supply and demand 
operate diverges considerably from the pattern with more conventional products or 
services.  At the same time, there is sufficient evidence that academic writing on law 
has become “better” over time to suggest that the pessimism implied by a cyclical 
account or Sunstein’s fad-driven thesis is not fully justified.   
A related point is that the various trajectories that have been identified are, at 
least in some measure, contradictory.  For instance, since Kuhn’s work was intended 
to cast doubt on the received wisdom on the accumulation of knowledge in the natural 
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sciences, legal scholarship seemingly cannot conform both to a Kuhnian framework 
and a scientifically-oriented cumulative model.  Also, if legal scholarship consists 
primarily of a “pendulum swing” conversation about enduring issues, it becomes 
difficult to envisage how there could be “progress” of any meaningful sort.  
Moreover, Sunstein’s account of fads constitutes an explicit challenge to those who 
believe a marketplace of ideas yields better academic writing about law.  
Is it possible to disentangle these various accounts of legal scholarship?  Is one 
trajectory truly predominant?  If not, do the dynamics involved necessarily conflict?  
Or is it possible for various trajectories to influence the evolution of legal scholarship 
simultaneously?  Part III of the paper considers these and related questions by way of 
a case study, with the focus being on corporate law scholarship.  A brief historically-
oriented summary of the literature will begin the discussion.  An international 
perspective will then be offered.  The remainder of part III will consider the extent to 
which corporate law scholarship has evolved in accordance with the various 
trajectories outlined thus far.    
III. CORPORATE LAW
A. Corporate Law Scholarship:  A Historical Sketch
  1. Corporate Personality
During the 19th century, legislatures in the United States, Britain and other 
jurisdictions began to enact “modern” corporate laws that established straightforward 
42
procedures for incorporating business enterprises.155  The first major theoretical 
debate to follow this development concerned corporate “personality”.  As legal 
historian Morton Horwitz has observed, “(b)eginning in the 1890s and reaching a high 
point around 1920, (this was) a virtual obsession in the legal literature”.156
Three camps of opinion could be discerned.157  First, the “fiction” or “artificial 
entity” theory held that corporate organizations were mere abstractions that owed their 
existence and legitimacy to an official grant of authority (a “concession”) from the 
state.158  Second, the contractual/association theory implied that a corporation was not 
a product of sovereign intervention but instead was an association constituted by the 
aggregation of freely contracting individuals, namely the shareholders.159  Third, the 
“real entity” theory held that a corporation was not fictional but instead had a 
distinctive personality in the same sense that a human being does.  This implied, in 
turn, that a corporate entity must be conceptually separate and distinct from those 
owning the equity.160
155 PAUL L. DAVIES, GOWER’S PRINCIPLES OF MODERN COMPANY LAW 36-46 (6th
ed. 1997); F.W. WEGENAST, THE LAW OF CANADIAN COMPANIES 17-27 (1931).    
156 HORWITZ, supra note xx, 101.   
157 Id. at 75; Mark M. Hager, Bodies Politic:  The Progressive History of 
Organizational “Real Entity” Theory, 50 U. PITT. L. REV. 575, 579-80 (1989).  
158 William W. Bratton, The New Economic Theory of the Firm:  Critical 
Perspectives from History, 41 STAN. L. REV. 1471, 1502-8 (1989).
159 Id. at 1489-90. 
160 Gregory A. Mark, The Personification of the Business Corporation in 
American Law, 54 U. CHI. L. REV. 1441, 1468-77 (1987); Dalia Tsuk, Corporations 
Without Labor:  The Politics of Progressive Corporate Law, 151 U. PA. L. REV. 1861, 
1871-72 (2003). 
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The dialogue concerning corporate personality was, for its time, strikingly 
theoretical in tone and was much more international in orientation than was traditional 
with legal discourse.161  Still, by 1930 the debate had largely ended.162  By this time, 
the consensus view was that the corporation was an important legal form that could 
not be treated, from the law’s point of view, as a mere contractual aggregation.  Also, 
though corporate personality had to be taken seriously from a legal perspective, 
corporate entities could not be analyzed as actual persons.  John Dewey, with an 
article published in 1926, did much to take the wind out of the corporate personality 
debate by saying it was misconceived because of a preoccupation with abstract 
concepts rather than concrete things.163
  2. Berle and Means
As the personification of the corporate entity faded as a concern, the stage was 
set for American legal academics to think about the corporation in functional rather 
than abstract terms.  Adolf Berle and Gardiner Means’ The Modern Corporation and 
Private Property,164 originally published in 1932, provided an ideal platform for the 
161 Mark, Personification, supra note xx, at 1465-67.  
162 Bratton, New, supra note xx, at 1493; BEN PETTET, COMPANY LAW 53 (2001). 
163 John Dewey, The Historic Background of Corporate Legal Personality, 35 
YALE L.J. 655 (1926).  On the impact of this article, see Hager, supra note xx, 635-
39; William W. Bratton, Berle and Means Reconsidered at the Century’s Turn, 26 J. 
CORP. L. 737, 741-43 (2001).
164 ADOLF A. BERLE AND GARDINER C. MEANS, THE MODERN CORPORATION & 
PRIVATE PROPERTY (Murray Weidenbaum and Mark Jensen eds., Transaction 
Publishers 1991) (1932).   
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shift in emphasis.165  The authors analyzed the results of a “corporate revolution” that 
had occurred in the US between 1880 and 1930.166  During this period, in many key 
industries small closely held firms managed by their founders gave way to big 
publicly traded companies characterized by managerial hierarchies.  In these “quasi-
public corporations”167 widely dispersed shareholders, each lacking a sufficient 
financial incentive to intervene directly, left it to professionally trained executives to 
deal with matters of importance.  The result, according to a phrase Berle and Means 
made famous, was a “separation of ownership and control”.168
An inference that many American corporate law scholars drew from Berle and 
Means’ separation of ownership and control thesis was that something was seriously 
amiss in publicly quoted corporations.169  More precisely, the “managerialist” pattern 
Berle and Means had described implied that those in charge of America’s larger 
business enterprises were not sufficiently accountable to shareholders.170 As a 
165 See Mark, Personification, supra note xx, at 1480-81 as well as HORWITZ, 
supra note xx, at 166; Bratton, Berle, supra note xx, at 743, 753-54; Gregory A. 
Mark, Realms of Choice:  Finance Capitalism and Corporate Governance, 95 
COLUM. L. REV. 969, 974-75 (1995).  
166 On the “corporate revolution” terminology, see Walter Werner, Corporation 
Law in Search of its Future, 81 COLUM. L. REV. 1611, 1641-42 (1981); William G. 
Roy, SOCIALIZING CAPITAL:  THE RISE OF THE LARGE INDUSTRIAL CORPORATION IN 
AMERICA 3, 176 (1997). 
167 BERLE AND MEANS, supra note xx, at 5.
168 Id. at 3. 
169 Henry G. Manne, The Myth of Corporate Responsibility or Will the Real 
Ralph Nader Please Stand Up?, 26 BUS. LAW. 533, 533 (1970).
170 Elliot J. Weiss, Social Regulation of Business Activity:  Reforming the 
Corporate Governance System to Resolve an Institutional Impasse, 28 U.C.L.A. L. 
REV. 343, 414 (1981); William J. Carney, The Legacy of “The Market for Corporate 
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Harvard economist said in 1959, “(a)lmost everyone now agrees that in the large 
corporation, the owner is, in general a passive recipient; that typically control is in the 
hands of management; and that management normally selects its own 
replacements”.171  The inference many drew was that managers of large corporations 
were “irresponsible oligarchs”.172
Academics who were concerned about the uneven balance of power between 
managers and shareholders advocated various types of reform.  These included 
fostering more participation by investors in corporate affairs (activating “shareholder 
democracy”),173 strengthening the fiduciary duties top executives owe to their 
companies174 and advocating strict monitoring of management by “outside” directors 
lacking any compromising link with management.175  Still, while corporate law 
academics frequently invoked the separation of ownership and control thesis to 
advocate stronger shareholder rights, this was not the only argument in favor of 
regulation that could be derived from The Modern Corporation and Private Property.  
Control” and the Origins of the Theory of the Firm, 50 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 215, 
221, 223 (1999).   
171 Edward S. Mason, Introduction, in THE CORPORATION IN MODERN SOCIETY 1, 
4 (Edward S. Mason ed., 1959).   
172 Carl Kaysen, The Social Significance of the Modern Corporation, 47 AM. 
ECON. REV. 311, 316 (1957).
173 Bayless Manning, Thinking Straight About Corporate Law Reform, 41 LAW & 
CONTEMP. PROBS. 3, 14 (1977).
174 Weiss, supra note xx, at 414.  
175 Melvin A. Eisenberg, Legal Models of Management Structure in the Modern 
Corporation:  Officers, Directors, and Accountants, 63 CAL. L. REV. 375, 407-9 
(1975).
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Instead, Berle and Means’ “analysis was a gun on a rotating platform that could be 
pointed in more than one direction.”176
Most notably, The Modern Corporation and Private Property posed, if 
indirectly, the question:  should the legal system make those managing corporations 
accountable to society as a whole?  The effect was to cast doubt on the received 
wisdom under U.S. law, which was that the objective of corporations is to generate 
profits for their shareholders (“shareholder primacy”).177  Berle and Means themselves 
stressed that power was increasingly being concentrated in the hands of large 
companies.178  This in turn implied that the corporation needed to be understood as a 
social and political institution, not merely an economic entity.179  Various U.S. 
academics, taking their cue from The Modern Corporation and Private Property, 
176 J.A.C. Hetherington, Redefining the Task of Corporation Law, 19 U.S.F.  L. 
REV. 229, 235 (1985).
177 Bratton, Berle, supra note xx, at 761-62; Phillip I. Blumberg, The 
Politicization of the Corporation, 26 BUS. LAW. 1551, 1556 (1971); SCOTT R. 
BOWMAN, THE MODERN CORPORATION AND AMERICAN POLITICAL THOUGHT:  LAW, 
POWER, AND IDEOLOGY, 186, 206 (1996).  On the law, see ROBERT C. CLARK, 
CORPORATE LAW 678-79 (1986); Stephen M. Bainbridge, Director Primacy:  The 
Means and Ends of Corporate Governance, 97 NW. U. L. REV. 547, 600-5 (2003).
178 BERLE AND MEANS, supra note xx, Book I, ch. 3.  On the importance of this 
theme, see Tsuk, supra note xx, at 1885-86.   
179 BERLE AND MEANS, supra note xx at 309-13.  It is somewhat ironic that Berle 
and Means’ work cast doubt on what was the received wisdom under American law, 
namely that generating profits for shareholders is the objective corporations should 
pursue.  This is because Berle, in a well-known exchange with E.M. Dodd, expressed 
doubt whether the law was capable of expanding to accommodate the perceived 
public responsibilities of the modern corporation.  See Adolf A. Berle, For Whom 
Corporate Managers are Trustees:  A Note, 45 HARVARD L. REV. 1365 (1932); 
Edwin M. Dodd, For Whom are Corporate Managers Trustees?, 45 HARVARD L. 
REV. 1145 (1932).  Berle subsequently conceded that the debate had been settled in 
favour of Dodd’s position:  A.A. BERLE, THE 20TH CENTURY CAPITALIST 
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cited the growing power of corporations to advocate changing the law to address 
concerns about corporate social responsibility.180
In 1962, one of the authors of The Modern Corporation and Private Property
observed that their work had achieved the status of “folklore” within the legal 
academy.181  American law professors concurred.  In 1984 Roberta Romano observed 
that “after half a century, discussion of the corporate form still invariably begins with 
Berle and Means’ location of the separation of ownership and control as the master 
problem for research”.182  Henry Manne put the point even more strongly, saying in 
1987 that “(n)o field of American law has ever been so totally dominated by one work 
as the corporation law area by the Berle and Means classic”.183
  3. Contractarian Analysis
REVOLUTION 169 (1955).  For an overview of the Berle/Dodd dialogue, see Tsuk, 
supra note xx, 1891-96, 1899. 
180 See, for example, Weiss, supra note xx, at 344-46, 418-26; Abram Chayes, 
The Modern Corporation and the Rule of Law in CORPORATION (Mason), supra note 
xx, 25, 38-45; Thomas J. Schoenbaum, The Relationship Between Corporate 
Disclosure and Corporate Responsibility, 40 FORDHAM L. REV. 565, 578, 587-94 
(1972).  
181 Adolf A. Berle, Modern Functions of the Corporate System, 62 COLUM. L. 
REV. 433, 433 (1962). 
182 Roberta Romano, Metapolitics and Corporate Law Reform, 36 STAN. L. REV.
923, 923 (1984).  
183 Henry G. Manne, Intellectual Styles and the Evolution of American Corporate 
Law, in ECONOMIC IMPERIALISM:  THE ECONOMIC APPROACH APPLIED OUTSIDE THE 
FIELD OF ECONOMICS, 219, 223 (Gerard Radnitzky and Peter Bernholz, eds., 1987).  
For similar observations, see Robert Hessen, A New Concept of Corporations:  A 
Contractual and Private Property Model, 30 HASTINGS L.J. 1327, 1329 (1979); 
George W. Dent, Toward Unifying Ownership and Control in the Public Corporation, 
[1989] WISC. L. REV. 881, 881; Craig LaChance, Nature v. Nurture, Evolution, Path 
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While Berle and Means’ work strongly influenced U.S. corporate law 
scholarship, the inferences drawn from it were subjected to increasingly critical 
scrutiny as the 20th century drew to a close.  A pivotal step in this process was the 
emergence of the economically-oriented “contractarian” model of the corporation.  
Prior to the 1970s, economists treated the business enterprise, typically referred to as a 
firm, as a “black box” that operated so as to maximize profits.184  The situation then 
changed.185  Economists began to concern themselves with how the conflicting 
objectives of individual participants associated with firms might be aligned so as to 
yield the hypothesized focus on profit maximization.186  The prevailing view became 
that market exchanges did not end at a firm’s front door.  Instead, the internal 
organization of business enterprises was the result of voluntary exchanges dictated by 
market forces.  At the same time, market dynamics defined the relationship between a 
firm and its suppliers, customers, creditors and so on.  The firm, in short, was a 
“nexus of contracts”.187
Dependence and Corporate Governance, 18 ARIZ. J. INT’L & COMP. L. 279, 282-83 
(2001).   
184 William W. Bratton, The “Nexus of Contracts” Corporation:  A Critical 
Appraisal, 74 CORNELL L. REV. 407, 415-16 (1989); Paddy Ireland, Defending the 
Rentier:  Corporate Theory and the Reprivatisation of the Public Company, in THE 
POLITICAL ECONOMY OF THE COMPANY 141, 157 (John Parkinson et al. eds., 2000).
185 Bratton, Nexus, supra note xx, at 415; Ireland, Defending, supra note xx, at 
157-58.   
186 Michael C. Jensen and William H. Meckling, Theory of the Firm:  Managerial 
Behavior, Agency Costs and Ownership Structure, 3 J. FIN. ECON. 305, 307 (1976).  
Ronald Coase had previously explored the issues involved:  Nature of the Firm, 4 
ECONOMICA 386 (1937).  His work, however, was largely ignored until the 1970s:  
Bratton, Nexus, supra note xx, at 416; Ireland, Defending, supra note xx, at 157. 
187 See Jensen and Meckling, Theory, supra note xx, at 311 (“a nexus for 
contracting relationships”); Eugene F. Fama, Agency Problems and the Theory of the 
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A pivotal aspect of the nexus of contracts model was “agency cost” theory.188
Again, the Berle-Means analysis of the widely held company implied that 
shareholders potentially might be subjected to the untrammeled whims of powerful 
executives.  Agency cost theory provided an analytical framework for examining this 
divergence of interest.  The starting point with the theory was that, whenever one 
individual (“the principal”) depends upon another (“the agent”), from an economic 
perspective an agency relationship arises.189  Since agents do not receive all of the 
returns from the profit enhancing activities they engage in on behalf of their 
principals, they will always be tempted to put their own interests first.  When agents 
in fact do so, the result is “agency costs”.  In a corporation with widely dispersed 
share ownership the shareholders, as principals, depend on management, as agents, to 
operate the business profitably.  Self-serving or reckless managerial conduct therefore 
creates agency costs for investors. 
While agency cost theory characterized in a systematic way the sort of 
incentive problems which Berle and Means had identified, it did more than this.  It 
implied as well that executives in widely held public companies were not as 
unaccountable as the separation of ownership and control thesis suggested.  This is 
because agency cost theory offered an intellectually elegant account of various 
Firm, 88 J. POL. ECON. 288, 290 (1980).  For background, see Margaret M. Blair, and 
Lynn A. Stout, A Team Production Theory of Corporate Law, 85 VA. L. REV. 247, 
319, n. 189 (1999). 
188 Jensen and Meckling, Theory, supra note xx was the seminal contribution to 
the literature.  For a summary of the agency cost concept, see BRIAN R. CHEFFINS, 
COMPANY LAW:  THEORY, STRUCTURE AND OPERATION 45 (1997).   
189 The economy theory of agency costs must be distinguished from the legal 
concept of agency:  CHEFFINS, supra note xx, at 45.  
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market-oriented limitations on the exercise of managerial discretion.190  One such 
constraint is the labor market for executives (senior managers want to run companies 
well to impress potential alternative employers).191  Another is the market for a 
company's products or services (executives will lose their jobs if a decline in market 
share is sufficiently precipitous to cause the company to fail).  Also significant is the 
capital market (companies which want to raise money receive less advantageous terms 
if there is evidence of mismanagement).  The market for corporate control constitutes 
an additional constraint on managerial misconduct since bidders, intent on generating 
profits by installing new executives, can make offers to the buy the outstanding equity 
of poorly run companies.  
In addition to providing a platform for re-evaluating the position of 
management, the nexus of contracts model opened the way for a reconceptualization 
of the shareholder’s status within the corporation.  As exemplified by the phrase 
“separation of ownership and control”, shareholders have often been characterized as 
the “owners” of a company.192  Contractarian analysis dispenses with this “tenacious 
notion”193 and instead treats those who own equity as “residual claimants”.194  From a 
190 Jason Scott Johnston, The Influence of “The Nature of the Firm” on the 
Theory of Corporate Law, 18 J. CORP. L. 213, 234-35 (1993).   
191 On this and other market-oriented constraints managers face, see CHEFFINS, 
supra note xx, at 117-23. 
192 Lynne L. Dallas, Working Toward a New Paradigm, in PROGRESSIVE 
CORPORATE LAW 35, 37 (Lawrence E. Mitchell, ed., 1995); Ross Grantham, The 
Doctrinal Basis of the Rights of Company Shareholders, 57 CAMBRIDGE L.J. 554, 
554-55 (1998); Paddy Ireland, Company Law and the Myth of Shareholder 
Ownership, 62 MOD. L. REV. 32, 32, 48-49 (1999).  
193 Fama, supra note xx, at 290; see also Daniel R. Fischel, The “Race to the 
Bottom” Revisited:  Reflections on Recent Developments in Delaware’s Corporation 
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contractual perspective, shareholders are defined in this way because they are the 
ultimate beneficiaries of whatever success a company enjoys, in the sense that the 
return on their investment is based on what is left over after other claims the company 
is obliged to meet have been satisfied.195  Hence, while others who are part of a 
corporate nexus of contracts will contract to receive fixed cash sums (e.g. creditors 
and employees), the return a company’s equity yields is variable in nature and is a 
function of the net cash flow the business generates over time.196
If shareholders in a company merely constitute one constituency that is part of 
a nexus of contracts, one could infer that the “shareholder primacy” principle that has 
influenced U.S. corporate law is misguided.197  “Contractarians”, however, did not 
embrace such logic and instead sought to justify the pre-eminent position of 
shareholders.  They defended shareholder primacy on the grounds that equity 
Law, 76 NW. U. L. REV. 913, 917-18 (1982); Stephen M. Bainbridge, In Defense of 
the Shareholder Wealth Maximization Norm:  A Reply to Professor Green, 50 WASH. 
& LEE L. REV. 1423, 1428 (1993).   
194 Ireland, Defending, supra note xx, at 164-66 (summarizing the literature).   
195 CHEFFINS, supra note xx, 54; William A. Klein, The Modern Business 
Organization:  Bargaining Under Constraints, 91 YALE L.J. 1521, 1538-40 (1982); 
Henry N. Butler, The Contractual Theory of the Corporation, 11 GEO. MASON L. 
REV. 99, 107 (1989).  For criticism of this reasoning, see Lynn A. Stout, Bad and Not-
so-Bad Arguments for Shareholder Primacy, 75 S. CAL. L. REV. 1189, 1193-95 
(2002). 
196 CHEFFINS, supra note xx, at 54, 71, 87; Klein, Modern, supra note xx, at 1538; 
FRANK H. EASTERBROOK, AND DANIEL R. FISCHEL, THE ECONOMIC STRUCTURE OF 
CORPORATE LAW 67-68 (1991). 
197 Frank H. Easterbrook, and Daniel R. Fischel, Voting in Corporate Law, 26 J. 
L. & ECON. 395, 403, 406 (1983); Melvin A. Eisenberg, The Conception That the 
Corporation is a Nexus of Contracts, and the Dual Nature of the Firm, 24 J. CORP. L.
819, 833-34 (1999); Thomas A. Smith, The Efficient Norm for Corporate Law:  A 
Neotraditional Interpretation of Fiduciary Duty, 98 MICH. L. REV. 214, 215-17 
(1999).
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investors, as residual claimants, have strong incentives to encourage maximum 
corporate achievement in a manner that benefits their fixed claim counterparts.198
Advocates of the nexus of contracts model also cited the respective bargaining 
positions of shareholders and non-shareholder constituencies to make their case.  The 
point made was that creditors, employees and customers can feasibly bargain for 
protection whereas shareholders cannot because of the open-ended nature of an 
investment in corporate equity.199
When the nexus of contracts model first arrived on the scene, various legal 
academics argued forcefully that it was inappropriate to conceptualize the corporation 
as a nexus of contracts.200  Nevertheless, the analytical framework ultimately proved 
to be highly influential, at least in the American context.  In fact, “(l)aw and 
economics…swept the academic corporate law area like prairie fire”,201 so that by 
early 1990s “the dominance of the nexus of contracts model in the legal academy” 
198 EASTERBROOK AND FISCHEL, supra note xx, at 38, 68; Mark E. Van der 
Weide, Against Fiduciary Duties to Corporate Stakeholders, 21 DEL. J. CORP. L. 27, 
57-66 (1996); Michael Bradley, et al., The Purposes and Accountability of the 
Corporation in Contemporary Society:  Corporate Governance at Crossroads, 62 
LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 9, 37-38 (1999). 
199 Van der Weide, supra note xx, at 35-55; Jonathan R. Macey and Geoffrey P. 
Miller, Corporate Stakeholders:  A Contractual Perspective, 43 U. TORONTO L.J. 401, 
416-19 (1993); Roberta Romano, Corporate Law and Corporate Governance, 5 
INDUS. & CORP. CHANGE 277, 279-80 (1996).
200 See, for example, Bratton, Nexus, supra note xx, Victor Brudney, Corporate 
Governance, Agency Costs and the Rhetoric of Contract, 85 COLUM. L. REV. 1403 
(1985); Melvin A. Eisenberg, The Structure of Corporation Law, 89 COLUM. L. REV. 
1461, 1485-88 (1989).  
201 Douglas M. Branson, A Corporate Paleontologist’s Look at Law and 
Economics in the Seventh Circuit, 65 CHICAGO-KENT L. REV. 745, 745 (1989).
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was becoming widely recognized.202  By the end of the decade matters had progressed 
to the point where the proposition “(t)hat a firm (such as a corporation) can be thought 
of as a ‘nexus of contracts’…ha(d) becom(e) something of a cliché in the 
university”.203  Indeed, there currently are those who believe that “(e)very book and 
journal article in the corporate law field ha(s) to take an economics of law perspective 
if they (are) to succeed in the marketplace of ideas.”204
4. The Nexus of Contracts Model as a Point of Departure
While contractarian analysis is currently the dominant school of thought 
among academic corporate lawyers in the U.S., its influence is in fact not monolithic.  
Instead, there a significant number of American corporate law academics who have 
serious misgivings about the nexus of contracts model.205  Those who have their 
doubts typically do not reject the economic approach in its entirety.  Instead, they tend 
202 William T. Allen, Contracts and Communities in Corporation Law, 50 WASH. 
& LEE L. REV. 1395, 1401 (1993).  See also Johnston, Influence, supra note xx, at 
213, 231; Lewis A. Kornhauser, The Nexus of Contracts Approach to Corporations:  
A Comment on Easterbrook and Fischel, 89 COLUM. L. REV. 1449, 1449 (1989); 
William W. Bratton, The Economic Structure of the Post-Contractual Corporation, 
87 NW. U. L. REV. 180, 180, 190 (1992). 
203 J. Mark Ramseyer, Corporate Law in 1 NEW PALGRAVE, supra note xx, 503, 
504 (1998).
204 Douglas M. Branson, Corporate Governance “Reform” and the New 
Corporate Social Responsibility, 62 U. PITT. L. REV. 605, 619 (2001).
205 Allen, Contracts, supra note xx, at 1399 (saying that some of corporate law’s 
“most respected minds remain among the unconverted”); G. Mitu Gulati et al., 
Connected Contracts, 47 U.C.L.A. L. REV. 887, 947 (2000).  See, for example, 
Rutherford B. Campbell, Corporate Fiduciary Principles for the Post-Contractarian 
Era, 23 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 561 (1996); Melvin A. Eisenberg, The Conception That 
the Corporation is a Nexus of Contracts, and the Dual Nature of the Firm, 24 J. 
CORP. L. 819 (1999).
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to accept the nexus of contracts as a pivotal analytical construct and use it as a point 
of departure so as to develop a more fully rounded conception of corporate law.206
One move made by those who are uneasy with the nexus of contracts model 
has been to invoke the concept of social norms.  The core belief is that the corporation 
is a prime domain of informal rules of conduct that do as much or more than 
enforceable legal obligations to shape and determine corporate behavior.207  The 
nexus of contracts model allegedly is not capable of making suitable allowances for 
this pattern since it tends to assume away gaps in contractual documentation 
governing relations between those associated with companies.208  Correspondingly, 
proponents of norms-oriented analysis say their approach offers a richer 
understanding of the interface between law and corporate activity than a standard 
economic framework.209
A potential limitation with a norms-oriented approach to corporate law is that 
it may end up constituting a useful but limited adjunct to contractarian thinking rather 
206 See, for instance, Campbell, Corporate, supra note xx, 576-77; Eric W. Orts, 
Shirking and Sharking:  A Legal Theory of the Firm, 16 YALE L. & POL’Y REV. 265, 
266-67, 298-99 (1998); Margaret M. Blair, and Lynn A. Stout, Trust, Trustworthiness, 
and the Behavioral Foundations of Corporate Law, 149 U. PA. L. REV. 1735, 1737-
38 (2001); Therese H. Maynard, Law Matters.  Lawyers Matter, 76 TUL. L. REV.
1501, 1507, 1528 (2002).
207 John C. Coffee, Do Norms Matter?  A Cross-Country Evaluation, 149 U. PA. 
L. REV. 2151, 2151 (2001); Melvin A. Eisenberg, Corporate Law and Social Norms, 
99 COLUM. L. REV. 1253, 1253-54, 1291 (1999).
208 Edward B. Rock, and Michael L. Wachter, Islands of Conscious Power:  Law, 
Norms and the Self-Governing Corporation, 149 U. PA. L. REV. 1619, 1629-30, 1638-
39 (2001).  
209 Id. at 1621-23.  Rock and Wachter prefer, however, to refer to “nonlegally 
enforceable rules and standards” or “NLERS” rather than norms:  id. at 1641.  
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than becoming a self-sufficient and robust analytical framework.210  Still, work done 
on the extralegal norm or practice of “trust” does offer an affirmative model that is 
intended to account in a systematic fashion for key aspects of corporate activity.  
More particularly, Margaret Blair and Lynn Stout have used trust as a departure point 
in asserting that the corporation is best understood as a team of people who enter into 
a complex agreement to work together for mutual gain.211  These academics argue 
that, with a company, individuals typically devote themselves to the firm in the hopes 
of sharing the benefits flowing from “team production”.  Those who do so tend not to 
seek full contractual protection for the “firm-specific” investments being incurred.212
Instead, according to Blair and Stout, they trust the board of directors to balance the 
interests of the constituencies associated with the corporation in an unbiased manner.  
The upshot is that the board is supposed to function as a “mediating hierarchy”.213
Blair and Stout say that the board of directors cannot provide a suitable 
rallying point for team production if it is simply a proxy for shareholder interests.  
Instead, they argue, the board must be an unbiased broker amongst a corporation’s 
210 Cf. Marcel Kahan, The Limited Significance of Norms for Corporate 
Governance, 149 U. PA. L. REV. 1869, 1870, 1900 (2001).  
211 On the wording, see Blair and Stout, Team, supra note xx, at 278.  They have 
developed their ideas further in Blair and Stout, Trust; supra note xx; Margaret M. 
Blair and Lynn A. Stout, Director Accountability and the Mediating Role of the 
Corporate Board, 79 WASH. U.L.Q. 403 (2001).  For related work on trust, see 
Lawrence E. Mitchell, Trust and Team Production in Post-Capitalist Society, 24 J. 
CORP. L. 869 (1999).  
212 Blair and Stout, Team, supra note xx, at 271-72, 275-76; Blair and Stout, 
Trust, supra note xx, at 1755; Blair and Stout, Director, supra note xx, at 411-21. 
213 Blair and Stout, Team, supra note xx, at 276-85; Blair and Stout, Director, 
supra note xx, at 421-22.  
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various constituencies.214  Correspondingly, Blair and Stout’s work constitutes an 
economically-oriented challenge to the “shareholder primacy” notion many 
contractarians advocate.215  The pair concedes that giving the board the discretion 
required to act as a neutral arbiter can give rise to agency problems since individual 
directors may have little or no financial stake in the firm.216  Nevertheless, with 
cultural norms of fairness and trust encouraging directors to serve the team in a 
faithful and “other-regarding” fashion, the benefits arising from the proper co-
ordination of team production allegedly exceed the costs.217
Blair and Stout defend their argument that boards will function in an “other-
regarding” manner by referring to experimentally oriented “behavioral economics” 
research.218  A pivotal lesson this literature offers is that, in particular test 
environments, people sacrifice their economic self-interest in order to be, or to appear, 
214 Blair and Stout, Team, supra note xx, at 253, 286, 298-305; Blair and Stout, 
Director, supra note xx, at 424-25.
215 David Millon, New Game Plan or Business as Usual?  A Critique of the Team 
Production Model of Corporate Law, 86 VA. L. REV. 1001, 1005-9, 1023-24 (2000).  
216 Blair and Stout, Team, supra note xx, at 283; Blair and Stout, Trust, supra
note xx, at 1756-57.
217 Blair and Stout, Team, supra note xx, at 283-84, 316; Blair and Stout, 
Director, supra note xx, at 436-43.  
218 Blair and Stout, Director, supra note xx, at 439-40; Blair and Stout, Trust, 
supra note xx, at 1741, 1766-74.  Blair and Stout do not specifically mention 
“behavioral economics”.  They rely sufficiently on the relevant literature, however, to 
be cited as authors who do so.  See, for example, Kent Greenfield, Using Behavioral 
Economics to Show the Power and Efficiency of Corporate Law as a Regulatory Tool, 
35 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 581, 585, n. 9 (2002).  
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“fair”.219  The experimental data currently available is compelling enough to justify 
corporate law scholars paying attention to potential cognitive biases that are 
inconsistent with mainstream economic thinking.220  Still, it remains unclear at present 
whether in real-world corporate settings the biases revealed in the behavioral 
economics literature operate to a significant degree.221  Hence, it is an open question 
whether corporate boards are likely to act as the neutral brokers hypothesized by Blair 
and Stout.   
The team production model does not stand alone as an attempt to use 
contractarian analysis as a jumping off point to develop a more nuanced conception of 
the corporation.  Law professors Henry Hansmann and Reinier Kraakman have also 
taken steps in this direction by emphasizing the proprietary aspect of business 
firms.222  They explicitly acknowledge that a firm constitutes a nexus of contracts but 
note that business is most often conducted through the medium of legal entities rather 
than simply via “contractual cascades”.223  Hansmann and Kraakman explain this on 
219 Cass R. Sunstein, Introduction in BEHAVIORAL LAW AND ECONOMICS 1, 8 
(Cass R. Sunstein, ed., 2000). 
220 Jennifer Arlen et al., Endowment Effects Within Corporate Agency 
Relationships, 31 J. LEGAL ST. 1, 2-4 (2002); for examples of corporate law 
scholarship where inferences have been drawn from behavioral economics, see 
Greenfield, Using, supra note xx, at 585, n. 9.   
221 Arlen et al., Endowment, supra note xx, at 5-6, 33. 
222 Henry Hansmann, and Reinier Kraakman, The Essential Role of 
Organizational Law, 110 YALE L.J. 387 (2000); Henry Hansmann and Reinier 
Kraakman, Organizational Law as Asset Partitioning, 44 EUR. ECON. REV. 807 
(2000).  See also John Armour and Michael J. Whincop, An Economic Analysis of 
Shared Property in Partnership and Close Corporations Law, 26 J. CORP. L. 983 
(2001). 
223 Hansmann and Kraakman, Essential, supra note xx, at 391.
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the basis that organizational law permits the formation of a firm that can have 
ownership of assets of its own.  
Corporate law, which is a key subset of organizational law, operates in two 
important ways with respect to the ownership of assets.  First, according to Hansmann
and Kraakman’s analysis, incorporation permits “affirmative” asset partitioning, 
which involves assigning to a company’s creditors a claim on corporate property that 
has priority over any rights of the personal creditors of the shareholders.224  Also, 
corporate law facilitates “defensive” asset partitioning, which encompasses shielding 
the assets of a corporation’s shareholders from corporate creditors via limited 
liability.225  Hansmann and Kraakman acknowledge, consistent with analysis offered 
from a contractarian perspective, that defensive asset partitioning could be achieved 
by contract.226  They assert, however, that it is effectively impossible to create 
affirmative asset partitioning using basic tools of property, contract and agency law, 
thus making corporate law “essential”.227
B. The International Dimension
Implicitly, the foregoing account of the evolution of corporate law scholarship 
has had an American orientation.  The reason is simple.  While the debate about 
224 Id. at 393-95.
225 Id.
226 Id. at 428-32; see also CHEFFINS, supra note xx, at 39-40.  It is not clear 
whether contractual efforts to create limited liability could be effective with tort 
claims.  Compare Armour and Whincop, supra note xx, at 995 and Paul G. Mahoney, 
Contract or Concession?  An Essay on the History of Corporate Law, 34 GA. L. REV.
873, 885-86 (2000).    
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corporate personality that took place at the beginning of the 20th century had a distinct 
international dimension,228 subsequently Americans have set the tone with theoretical 
work on corporate law.229  What, then, has been the position with corporate law 
scholarship elsewhere?  The general trend has been to avoid analyzing the subject 
matter in interdisciplinary terms.  For instance, in continental Europe, “hermetically 
sealed doctrinal analysis” has traditionally dominated the corporate law field and 
continues to do so at present.230  The situation was, at least until quite recently, the 
same in the United Kingdom.  The doctrinal orientation of the relevant literature led 
one critic to say in 1986:
“(C)ompany lawyers lack an intellectual tradition which places the particular 
rules and doctrines of their discipline within a broader theoretical framework 
which gives meaning and coherence to them.”231
Canadian and Australian corporate law scholarship yielded similar harsh verdicts.232
227 Hansmann and Kraakman, Essential, supra note xx, at 406-23.
228 Supra note xx and related discussion. 
229 Cheffins, Using, supra note xx, at 209.
230 John W. Cioffi, State of the Art:  A Review Essay on “Comparative Corporate 
Governance:  The State of the Art and Emerging Research,” 48 AM. J. COMP. L. 501, 
509 (2000).  See also Nicholas H.D. Foster, Company Law Theory in Comparative 
Perspective:  England and France, 48 AM. J. COMP. L. 573, 606-8 (2000).   
231 Mary Stokes, Company Law and Legal Theory in LEGAL THEORY AND 
COMMON LAW 155, 155 (William Twining ed., 1986).  See also Foster, supra note xx 
at 586-92; Pippa Rogerson, Book Review, (1994) 53 CAMBRIDGE L.J. 601, 601.  There 
were occasional isolated exceptions to the dominant pattern, such as TOM HADDEN, 
COMPANY LAW AND CAPITALISM (1972). 
232 Kathleen A. Lahey, and Sarah W. Salter, Corporate Law in Legal Theory and 
Legal Scholarship:  From Classicism to Feminism, 23 OSGOODE HALL L.J. 543, 557-
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The doctrinal orientation that has prevailed outside the United States appears 
to be eroding.233  In continental Europe, those legal academics interested in 
accountability and decision-making within publicly quoted companies (“corporate 
governance”) are increasingly looking at issues from an interdisciplinary 
perspective.234  In Britain, Australia and Canada matters have evolved further.  
Theoretical company law scholarship is now quite well-established, with a growing 
literature emerging in all three countries.235
Since the shift towards interdisciplinary analysis has been recent in 
orientation, the nexus of contracts model that has influenced the American literature 
so strongly has inevitably had an impact on theoretical research being conducted 
outside the U.S.236  Indeed, observers in Australia, Canada and the U.K. generally 
69 (1985); Katherine H. Hall, The Interior Design of Corporate Law:  Why Theory is 
Vital to the Development of Corporate Law in Australia, 6 AUSTL. J. CORP. L. 1, 1, 4-
5 (1996); David Wishart, Does the High Court Understand Corporations Law? 6 
AUSTL. J. CORP. L. 424, 436-38 (1996) (acknowledging that some theoretical work 
was being done in Australia but arguing that it was superficial in orientation).
233 This is consistent with general trends.  See Van Zandt, supra note xx, at 968 
(saying that foreign scholars increasingly want to learn more about American theories 
and approaches and see their own country’s scholarship as too closely tied to 
practice).   
234 Cioffi, supra note xx, at 508-9.   
235 Cheffins, Using, supra note xx, at 209; Foster, supra note xx, at 593-94; Byran 
Horrigan, Teaching and Integrating Recent Developments in Corporate Law, Theory 
and Practice, 13 AUSTL. J. OF CORP. L. 182, 185-86 (2001).  For a more pessimistic 
appraisal of the situation in Australia, see Frank Carrigan, The Role of Capital in 
Regulating the Duty of Care and Business Judgment Rule, 14 AUSTL. J. OF CORP. L.
215, 215-16, 237-38 (2002). 
236 Cioffi, supra note xx, at 509; Foster, supra note xx, at 593; J. Anthony 
VanDuzer, Book Review, 77 CAN. BAR REV. 567, 567 (1998); Michael Whincop, Of 
Fault and Default:  Contractarianism as a Theory of Anglo-Australian Corporate 
Law, 21 MELB. U. L. REV. 187, 188-89 (1997).   
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acknowledge that the nexus of contract model has been dominating the theoretical 
discourse.237  Still, while the economic approach to corporate law that has been so 
influential in the United States has attracted attention elsewhere, its impact has varied.  
Canadian scholars look regularly to the law and economics literature to give shape to 
their analysis of corporate law issues.238  In Britain, on the other hand, there is a 
tendency to acknowledge law and economics, cite its limitations and shift to a 
different theoretical ground.239  A typical move U.K. academics currently make is to 
discuss the company by reference to “stakeholder theory”, which entails analyzing 
corporate issues by reference to employees and others potentially having a “stake” in 
a business (e.g. suppliers, customers and perhaps society at large).240
C. Corporate Law Scholarship as Science
With the key themes in corporate law scholarship duly accounted for, it is now 
possible to consider the extent to which the literature has evolved in accordance with 
the various potential trajectories considered in Part II of the paper.  Let us begin with 
237 Grantham, supra note xx, at 578-79; J.E. Parkinson, The Contractual Theory 
of the Company and the Protection of Non-Shareholder Interests in CORPORATE AND 
COMMERCIAL LAW:  MODERN DEVELOPMENTS, 121, 121 (David Feldman and Frank 
Meisel, eds., 1996); Robert Yalden, Book Review 31 CAN. BUS. L.J. 479, 479, (1999); 
Michael Whincop, Painting the Corporate Cathedral:  The Protection of Entitlements 
in Corporate Law, 19 OXFORD J. LEGAL ST. 19, 19-20 (1999).  
238 Yalden, supra note xx, at 479.
239 See, for example, PETTET, supra note xx, at 78-81; Parkinson, Contractual, 
supra note xx, at 140-41; JANET DINE, THE GOVERNANCE OF CORPORATE GROUPS 12-
17 (2000).  On why law and economics is treated with skepticism in the U.K., see 
David Campbell, Book Review, 24 J.  LAW & SOC. 574, 574-75 (1997); Richard 
Posner, The Future of the Law and Economics Movement in Europe, 17 INT’L REV. L. 
& ECON. 3, 3-5 (1997).
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the accumulation of knowledge by scientific investigation.  Again, the methodology 
involved is an enquiry founded upon the safeguards of explicit theory-building,
replication and corroboration.241  Has this analytical technique had a substantial 
influence on the trajectory of corporate law scholarship? This question will now be 
assessed by examining circumstances where the explicit formulation and testing of 
hypotheses plausibly could have played a role.  
Berle and Means’ analysis of the corporate economy in the United States 
constitutes the first instance that merits consideration.  A pivotal component of their 
work can certainly be characterized in scientific terms.  Again, Berle and Means 
hypothesized that, at the time they were writing (1932), there was a separation of 
ownership and control in large companies in the U.S.  They did not, however, leave 
matters at that.  Instead, they sought to prove the point by defining when a corporation 
had sufficiently diffuse share ownership to qualify as management controlled and by 
finding out how equity was in fact distributed in the country’s larger business 
enterprises.242  Since Berle and Means’ work had this strong empirical dimension, 
subsequent researchers could scrutinize their methodology and seek to affirm or refute 
the results by way of their own investigations.243  Correspondingly, The Modern 
Corporation and Private Property did have a scientific aspect.  
240 PETTET, supra note xx, at 66, n. 105 (citing examples from the “immense” 
literature);  
241 Supra note xx and related discussion.   
242 BERLE AND MEANS, supra note xx, Book I, chs. 4, 5.  
243 On efforts made to follow up on Berle and Means’ empirical work, see 
ROBERT J. LARNER, MANAGEMENT CONTROL AND THE LARGE CORPORATION 6-24 
(1970).
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Still, the scientific credentials of Berle and Means’ work must be kept in 
perspective.  Contrary to what a scientist might have done, Berle and Means did not 
restrict themselves to describing an empirical phenomenon in value-free 
terminology.244  Instead, they condemned the separation of ownership and control in 
explicitly normative terms, identified lax corporate law doctrines as contributing to an 
allegedly abusive arrangement and suggested how tougher laws might improve 
matters.245  Legal academics examining the status of directors and shareholders 
subsequently went a step further and simply assumed there was a problem that needed 
to be solved and recommended increased regulation as a solution.246  Matters 
ultimately reached the point where corporate law scholarship lacked any genuine 
scientific pretensions.  As law professor John Coffee observed in 1977:
“Although lawyers as a group are frequently inattentive to developments in 
allied social sciences, the field of corporation law presents an egregious 
example of cultural lag.  Dominated by centuries-old fiduciary 
concepts…corporate law has not considered to any significant degree the 
relevance of social science.”247
The second instance where scientific methodology plausibly could have 
influenced corporate law scholarship involved the use of economic theory.  Very soon 
244 Johnston, Influence, supra note xx, at 220. 
245 See, for example, BERLE AND MEANS, supra note xx, Book II, chs. I-IV, VII. 
246 Johnston, Influence, supra note xx, at 219-29.   
247 John C. Coffee, Beyond the Shut-Eyed Sentry:  Toward a Theoretical View of 
Corporate Misconduct and an Effective Legal Response, 63 VA. L. REV. 1099, 1109-
10 (1977).   
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after Coffee bemoaned the minimal impact that social science was having on the 
corporate law field, the economic “prairie fire” began.248  Again, an alleged virtue of 
law and economics is that it allows for the accumulation of knowledge in a scientific 
fashion since empirically disprovable hypotheses can be produced and tested.249
Certain advocates of the economic approach to corporate law have indeed advanced 
this proposition in order to press the case in favor of contractarian analysis.250  Critics 
in turn were prepared to concede the point to some degree, saying that economic 
theory was a “valuable addition to the toolbox”251 and had left “the central underlying 
issues in corporate law exposed as never before.”252
In at least one respect, economic analysis indeed did make corporate law 
research more “scientific”.  The innovation in question was the introduction of event 
study methodology, which measures unexpected changes in share prices due to the 
adoption of new corporate law rules, judicial rulings or decisions taken by 
corporations.253  Event studies have a scientific aspect because they provide 
researchers with the opportunity to formulate theories about the impact which a 
248 Supra notes xx to xx and related text.   
249 Supra note xx and accompanying discussion.   
250 Johnston, Influence, supra note xx, at 239-40; Fred S. McChesney, 
Economics, Law, and Science in the Corporate Field, 89 COLUM. L. REV. 1530, 1538 
(1989).   
251 Lyman Johnson, Individual and Collective Sovereignty in the Corporate 
Enterprise, 92 COLUM. L. REV. 2215, 2217-18 (1992).
252 Lawrence E. Mitchell, Groundwork of the Metaphysics of Corporate Law, 50 
WASH. & LEE L. REV. 1477, 1477 (1993).
253 Sanjai Bhagat and Roberta Romano, Event Studies and the Law:  Part II –
Empirical Studies of Corporate Law, 4 AM. L. & ECON. REV. 380, 381 (2002).
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particular action is likely to have on shareholders and then carry out testing by using 
share price fluctuations as a metric.  Event study research has been carried out with 
increasing regularity since the 1980s and the result now is that no important topic of 
corporate governance has been left untouched.254
The invocation of economic analysis may well have introduced additional 
intellectual rigor to the study of corporate law.  Nevertheless, the influence of 
scientific methodology should not be exaggerated.  Event studies, for instance, are not 
necessarily models of experimental precision.  Instead, their utility is intrinsically 
linked to contestable assumptions that share prices react quickly to new information 
and are a reliable indicator of firm value.255
Moving outside the realm of event studies, economically-oriented research on 
corporate law has shaky scientific credentials.  If scientific methodology was truly 
influential, practitioners of the economic approach to corporate law would 
systematically generate the sort of predictions that can be verified or falsified on an 
empirical basis.256  Examples of this approach can certainly be found.  For instance, 
over the past few years, various financial economists have used statistical measures of 
corporate law “quality” and cross-border data on share ownership to test the 
254 Bhagat and Romano, Part II, supra note xx, at 382.  
255 On the informational content of share prices and event studies, see Sanjai 
Bhagat and Roberta Romano, Event Studies and the Law:  Part I – Technique and 
Corporate Litigation, 4 AM. L. & ECON. REV. 141, 143 (2002) (saying, though, that 
event studies may be useful even if share prices do not adjust rapidly to new 
information).  On the fact that it cannot be taken for granted that share prices are a 
reliable indicator of firm value, see ANDREI SHLEIFER, INEFFICIENT MARKETS:  AN 
INTRODUCTION TO BEHAVIORAL FINANCE (2000).   
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proposition that strong shareholder protection yields robust securities markets and a 
separation of ownership and control in large firms.257  The hypotheses advanced by 
economically-oriented corporate law academics have generally tended, however, to 
involve imprecise variables such as “third-party effects” and “transaction costs”.258
The danger correspondingly exists that their models can predict “any conceivable 
position that the law might take.  No falsifiable conclusion has been reached; no act of 
science has been committed”.259  We have already seen that doubts have been 
expressed about the scientific status of economic analysis of law.260  It would seem 
that, despite useful empirical work, concerns of this sort are justified in the particular 
context of corporate law.    
D. Corporate Law Paradigms
Kuhn’s characterization of knowledge evolving by reference to “normal 
science” and “paradigm shifts” has proved infectious outside the realm of natural 
science.261  Corporate law has not escaped the trend.  Instead, various academics 
256 Fred S. McChesney, Positive Economics and All That, 61 GEO. WASH. L. 
REV. 272, 281 (1992)
257 For overviews of the literature, see Stephen J. Choi, Law, Finance and Path 
Dependence:  Developing Strong Securities Markets, 80 TEX. L. REV. 1657, 1672-73 
(2002); Diane K. Denis and John J. McConnell, International Corporate Governance, 
38 J. FIN. & QUANTITATIVE ANALYSIS, 1, 20-26 (2003)
258 McChesney, Positive, supra note xx, at 289-92 (reviewing EASTERBROOK AND 
FISCHEL, supra note xx).
259 McChesney, Positive, supra note xx, at 292. 
260 Supra note xx and accompanying text.
261 Supra note xx and related discussion.
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seeking to characterize intellectual trends in the field have relied on Kuhn’s 
terminology.262
A plausible Kuhnian précis of corporate law scholarship can certainly be 
offered.  It might proceed as follows.  The debate over corporate personality that took 
place prior to 1930 would qualify as corporate law’s “immature” phase since there 
was little agreement about how to define the corporation.263  Berle and Means’ 
separation of ownership and control thesis then marked a decisive break because it 
was sufficiently convincing to become the dominant paradigm within the field of 
corporate law.264  After the emergence of the separation of ownership and control as a 
pivotal intellectual construct, a period of normal science followed where the focus 
was on regulatory strategies designed to address the “core” problem Berle and Means 
had identified.  
According to Kuhn, the discovery of inexplicable “anomalies” that are 
irreconcilable with the dominant paradigm can puncture the consensus associated 
262 See infra notes xx and xx and accompanying text. 
263
“Paradigm” terminology has been used to describe the corporate personality 
debate:  Stephen Bottomley, Taking Corporations Seriously:  Some Considerations 
for Corporate Regulation, 19 FED. L. REV. 203, 206-13 (1990).  This usage, however, 
is inconsistent with Kuhn’s analytical framework since he assumed that consensus, 
not disagreement, was required for there to be a paradigm within the relevant field.  
For a more nuanced use of Kuhn’s terminology with respect to the debate over 
corporate personality, see Mark, Personification, supra note xx, at 1466, n. 66. 
264 Examples of those who have described Berle and Means’ work in this way 
include Bratton, Economic, supra note xx, at 180; Carney, Legacy, supra note xx, at 
217, 224; Thomas Lee Hazen, The Corporate Persona, Contract (and Market) 
Failure, and Moral Values, 69 N.C. L. REV. 273, 304 (1991).
68
normal science.265  With the Berle and Means’ paradigm, a paradox which emerged 
was that the separation of ownership and control had not created appreciable concern 
among those allegedly most affected, namely shareholders.266  Or as Henry Manne 
said in 1970:
“…if things were as Berle believed, it is very difficult to understand why 30 
million Americans would continue to put money into the hands of corporate 
executives….We would have to assume that American investors were either 
the greatest collection of fools the world had ever seen or that they were 
charitable to a degree that even saints could not aspire to.”267
Manne’s explanation for what was going on was that corporate executives were not as 
unaccountable as they seemed.  As he explained in a series of articles he wrote in the 
1960s, market constraints, such as the market for corporate control, the capital market 
and product markets, served to curb managerial discretion.268
In Kuhnian terms, Manne’s provocative critique of the received wisdom 
signaled a crisis within corporate law scholarship.269  A “scientific revolution” then 
265 Supra note xx and accompanying text. 
266 J.A.C. Hetherington, Fact and Legal Theory:  Shareholders, Managers, and 
Corporate Social Responsibility, 21 STAN. L. REV. 248, 272 (1969); Robert Hessen, 
The Modern Corporation and Private Property:  A Reappraisal, 26 J. L. & ECON. 
273, 288 (1983).
267 Manne, Myth, supra note xx, at 534.
268 On Manne’s work on this topic, see Carney, Legacy, supra note xx, at 231-36. 
269 Manne suggested that economic theory could explain the modern corporation 
by considering it as an efficient outcome of contacting parties.  See, for example, 
Henry G. Manne, Current Views on the “Modern Corporation”, 38 U. DET. L. REV.
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ensued, this being the emergence of the nexus of contracts model in the 1970s.  The 
subsequent contractarian “prairie fire” then left economic analysis as the dominant 
paradigm in corporate law.270  Continuing to the present day, the academic study of 
corporate law currently is in a period of “normal science” where most theoretical 
analysis is conducted through the prism of economics.  Nevertheless, the work being 
done on norms, the team production model and asset partitioning constitute 
sufficiently ambitious departures from the prevailing mode of analysis to suggest that 
the existing consensus might be unstable or eroding.271  Perhaps, then, a new 
“paradigm shift” is imminent.272
While it is certainly possible to rely on Kuhn’s analytical framework to 
describe the evolution of academic writing on corporate law, the “fit” is far from 
perfect.  Again, relying on Kuhn’s work to characterize trends in legal scholarship 
involves a problematic leap in logic since he was focusing on scientific methodology 
559, 583, 587-88 (1960); Henry G. Manne, The Higher Criticism of the Modern 
Corporation, 62 COLUM. L. REV. 399, 431 (1962).  He did not, however, offer an 
affirmative theory that explained the modern corporation by reference to the criteria 
that characterized the economic analysis of markets.  See Allen Kaufman and 
Lawrence Zacharias, From Trust to Contract:  The Legal Language of Managerial 
Ideology, 1920-1980, 66 BUS. HIST. REV. 523, 546-47, 553 (1992). 
270 For examples of those who have described contractarian analysis in these 
terms, see Bratton, Economic, supra note xx, at 180-81, 190; Whincop, Painting, 
supra note xx, at 27; Allen, Contracts, supra note xx, at 1401, 1406; Robert John 
Schulze, Can This Marriage be Saved?  Reconciling Progressivism with Profits in 
Corporate Governance Laws, 49 STAN. L. REV. 1607, 1610 (1997).  
271 Cf. Johnson, Individual, supra note xx, at 2218 (offering the same verdict but 
referring to different aspects of corporate law theory).   
272 Ulen, Nobel, supra note xx, at 886-87 (making the same point about economic 
analysis generally, referring to work which has been done in the field of behavioral 
economics).   
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and this is not the dominant mode of enquiry in law.273  This objection is pertinent in 
the present context because, as we have just seen, the scientific credentials of 
corporate law research are shaky.274
Even if it is taken for granted that academic writing on law can be properly 
evaluated in Kuhnian terms, it may still not be appropriate to talk about the evolution 
of corporate law scholarship in terms of paradigms, normal science and so on.  This is 
because the sort of tight research consensus that distinguishes a “mature” field of 
research from its “pre-paradigm” counterpart may have been lacking.  Consider the 
nexus of contracts model which is currently dominant in American corporate law 
scholarship.  Despite its pre-eminence, the efforts that are currently being made to 
expand the research agenda via the analysis of norms, trust and proprietary concepts 
illustrate that the model is not accepted on an unqualified basis.  Also, there are 
various American corporate law academics who simply remain largely 
unconverted.275
Taking the situation outside the U.S. into account casts even more doubt on 
the idea that corporate law can be thought of by reference to a tight research 
consensus.  Berle and Means’ work was the key point of departure in the U.S. from 
the 1930s to the 1980s.  Elsewhere, however, the situation was different since 
273 Supra notes xx to xx and related discussion.  
274 Supra notes xx to xx and accompanying text. 
275 Supra note xx and related discussion.    
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academics focused almost entirely on doctrinal research.276  Turning to the present 
day, the nexus of contracts model is certainly influential in Canada and Australia as 
well as the U.S.277  In the United Kingdom, on the other hand, economic analysis is 
not dominant and in continental Europe it is only just beginning to establish a 
foothold.278  The upshot is that, unless one is prepared to treat an individual country 
such as the U.S. as the appropriate reference point, corporate law has consistently 
lacked the disciplinary matrix that Kuhn argued was required for academics to engage 
in “mopping up” activity.279
E. Corporate Law Scholarship and the Marketplace for Ideas
The assumption made earlier, if only for the sake of argument, was that there 
is scope for progress within legal scholarship.280  Under such conditions, a 
marketplace for ideas can potentially act as the catalyst for a move towards “better” 
276 On the doctrinal focus outside the United States, see supra notes xx to xx and 
accompanying text.  Still, the differences between the U.S. and other countries should 
not be overemphasized since up to the 1980s much American corporate law 
scholarship was doctrinally oriented:  Johnson, Individual, supra note xx, at 2217; 
Charles R.T. O’Kelley, Foreword:  The Many Passions of Teaching Corporations, 34 
GA L. REV. 423, 426 (2000).  Moreover, it would have been somewhat perverse if 
Berle and Means’ work had set the agenda outside the U.S. since a separation of 
ownership and control is not the norm elsewhere.  See Rafael La Porta et al., Investor 
Protection and Corporate Governance, 58 J. FIN. ECON. 3, 15 (2000). 
277 Supra note xx and related discussion. 
278 Supra notes xx to xx and accompanying text.   
279 Perhaps, though, corporate law could be conceptualized in terms of a model 
derived from Kuhn known as the “multiparadigm perspective”.  On this notion, see 
Dennis A. Gioia, and Evelyn Pitre, Multiparadigm Perspectives on Theory Building, 
15 ACAD. MGMT. REV. 584 (1990). 
280 Supra notes xx to xx and accompanying text.
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academic writing on law.281  Is there evidence of a market-driven momentum towards 
“improvement” in the corporate law field?  Though the case is not clear cut, there is 
indeed some.  
First, the “bad” news on progress.  Criticisms about unnecessary length and 
documentation have been leveled against legal scholarship.282  Such vices can 
certainly afflict academics writing about corporate law.  For instance, an article in the 
closely related field of securities regulation that explored a single section of a single 
statute currently holds the record for the longest law review article.283
More generally, when matters are considered in historical terms, corporate law 
can legitimately stand accused of lacking a distinguished intellectual pedigree. 
According to one pessimist, as of 1962 “corporation law, as a field of intellectual 
effort, (was) dead in the United States”.284  Matters seemingly had improved little by 
1984, when Romano characterized corporate law as “an uninspiring field for 
research”.285
A similarly bleak prognosis has been offered at various junctures elsewhere.  
In Canada, in the mid-1980s critics of the country’s corporate law scholarship decried 
281 Supra notes xx to xx and related discussion.   
282 Supra notes xx to xx and accompanying text.
283 Arnold S. Jacobs, An Analysis of Section 16 of the Securities Exchange Act of 
1934, 32 N.Y.L. SCH.  L. REV. 209 (1987), which is over 490 pages in length and has 
some 4800 footnotes.  On its status as the article with the most footnotes, see Rhode, 
supra note xx, at 1334-35; Lasson, Scholarship, supra note xx, at 937-38.   
284 Bayless Manning, The Shareholder’s Appraisal Remedy:  An Essay for Frank 
Coker, 72 YALE L.J. 223, 245, n. 37 (1962).
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the “invisibility of contextual and theoretical influences” and alleged that the “choice 
of topics and methods for scholarly examination appears to have generally been an 
unsystematized exercise of personal preferences.”286  In Britain, company law was not 
even recognized as a respectable academic subject until at least the 1950s.287  With 
respect to the rest of Europe, in 2000 a reviewer of a book on corporate governance 
bemoaned “the hermetically sealed doctrinal analysis common in Continental, and 
especially German law”.288
Now, the “good” news:  the pessimism about corporate law scholarship has 
dissipated to a significant degree.  Dan Prentice, a leading British company law 
scholar, remarked in 1993 that academic writing on the topic had “improved 
immeasurably in terms of quality” during the previous decade.289  Robert Yalden, a 
Canadian legal practitioner, argued in 1999 that “the level and quality of scholarship 
concerning Canadian corporate law ha(d) improved considerably in the past years 30 
years”.290  With respect to the United States, in 1992 Romano reversed her pessimistic 
1984 appraisal, saying that corporate law had undergone “a revolution over the past 
285 Romano, Metapolitics, supra  note xx, at 923. 
286 Lahey and Salter, Corporate Law, supra note xx, at 569. 
287 Caroline Bradley and Judith Freedman, Changing Company Law, 53 MOD. L. 
REV. 397, 398 (1990); C.A. Riley, Gower:  Still a Blueprint for Curriculum Reform in 
Company Law?, 13 OXFORD J. LEGAL STUD. 271, 271 (1993).   
288 Cioffi, State, supra note xx, at 509.   
289 D.D. Prentice, Some Observations on the Teaching of Company Law, in
EXAMINING THE SYLLABUS:  BEYOND THE CORE, 33, 35 (P.B.H. Birks ed., 1993).   
290 Yalden, supra note xx, at 479.  See also Richard W. Bauman, Liberalism and 
Canadian Corporate Law, in CANADIAN PERSPECTIVES ON LEGAL THEORY, 75, 75  
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decade”.291  Richard Buxbaum, another U.S. law professor, said in 1993 that a new 
generation of corporate law academics was “tearing up the track and making 
corporation law the hottest game in town”.292  Deborah DeMott, also an American 
legal academic, echoed the same sentiments in 1996.  She said that there had been 
“invigorated discussion and deepened analysis” in a field where the literature had 
been “uninspiring” and “parochial” in scope.293
Those who have argued that there has been a beneficial transformation of 
corporate law scholarship in recent years have generally acknowledged that the 
invocation of economic analysis has had a pivotal influence.  For instance, Yalden 
noted “that the law and economics movement has had a profound impact on the way 
in which corporate law is taught in Canada”294 and Prentice explicitly recognized the 
substantial effect economic analysis has had on corporate law scholarship.295
Similarly, in the United States, the economic approach to corporate law has been 
(Richard F. Devlin ed., 1991) (referring to a “recent rebirth of a combined intellectual 
and political approach to corporate doctrine and scholarship”).
291 Roberta Romano, Preface, in FOUNDATIONS OF CORPORATE LAW, v, v  
(Roberta Romano ed., 1992).  
292 Richard M. Buxbaum, New Owners and Old Managers:  Lessons from the 
Socialist Camp, 18 DEL. J. CORP. L. 867, 868 (1993).   
293 Deborah A. DeMott, Trust and Tension Within Corporations, 81 CORNELL L. 
REV. 1308, 1308, 1335 (1996).  
294 Yalden, supra note xx, at 479.
295 Prentice, supra note xx, at 35. 
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credited for revitalizing “among the sleepiest of legal fields”.296  As Lyman Johnson, a 
self-confessed law and economics septic, said in 1992 about economic analysis:
“Few can doubt that corporate law – long a field heavily doctrinaire and 
almost nontheoretical – has forever been changed (and bettered) over the past 
dozen years by this infusion”.297
Romano, Buxbaum and DeMott each offered a similar verdict when giving their 
optimistic appraisals of corporate law scholarship.298  The upshot is that, even if 
“progress” cannot be taken for granted in the area of corporate law, there is a 
widespread belief that the admittedly controversial law and economics “prairie fire” 
did yield a “better” understanding of the topics under investigation.  
F. Corporate Law Cycles  
The admittedly optimistic characterization of corporate law scholarship just 
presented has a potentially weak foundation since the underlying premise was that 
“progress” results from a marketplace for ideas.  Market failure may, however, be 
prevalent in the area of legal scholarship.299  Correspondingly, it cannot be taken for 
granted that things really have gotten “better” or, if they have, they will continue to do 
so.  An alternate scenario that merits consideration is that much of what is being said 
296 Johnston, Influence, supra note xx, at 219.
297 Johnson, Individual, supra note xx, at 2217.  On Johnson’s skepticism towards 
economics, see id. at 2217-18. 
298 Romano, Preface, supra note xx, at 5; Buxbaum, supra note xx, at 868; 
DeMott, supra note xx, at 1312, 1335.  See also Mitchell, Groundwork, supra note 
xx, at 1477, 1481-82; O’Kelley, Foreword, supra note xx, at 426.  
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now has been said before.  This is because a potential trajectory for legal scholarship 
is cyclical, in the sense that the literature constitutes a continuing conversation about 
pivotal questions.300
This possibility has in fact been recognized in corporate law scholarship.  As 
one corporate lawyer observed in a law review article published in 1991, “(o)ne of the 
characteristics of corporation law, and indeed, perhaps of life, is that few issues are 
ever settled conclusively”.301  Similar sentiments were echoed in another essay 
published a few years earlier, where it was said that, because of the “ebb and flow of 
popular conceptions”, “(t)o address the future of corporation law, we must look first 
to the past”.302
The question “what is a corporation?” illustrates that the cyclical perspective is 
potentially instructive.303  For instance, the nexus of contracts model that has been so 
influential in the past two decades has rhetoric in common with the 
“contractual/association” thesis that was being offered in the early 20th century.304
299 Supra notes xx to xx and accompanying text.  
300 Supra notes xx to xx and related discussion.    
301 A.A. Sommer, Whom Should the Corporation Serve?  The Berle-Dodd Debate 
Revisited Sixty Years Later, 16 DEL. J. CORP. L. 33, 33 (1991).  See also William T. 
Allen, Our Schizophrenic Conception of the Business Corporation, 14 CARDOZO L. 
REV. 261, 278-81 (1992); Eric W. Orts, The Complexity and Legitimacy of Corporate 
Law, 50 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 1565, 1571 (1993).   
302 Elliott Goldstein, Future Articulation of Corporation Law, 39 BUS. LAW.
1541, 1541 (1984). 
303 Allen, Our, supra note xx, 280-81.   
304 See Bratton, New, supra note xx, 1472-73, 1513-15, 1526; Gregory A. Mark, 
Some Observations on Writing the Legal History of the Corporation in the Age of 
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Also, there may be links between the “fiction” theory that corporate organizations 
owe their existence to an official grant of authority from the state and Hansmann and 
Kraakman’s contemporary work concerning asset partitioning.305  This is because 
both imply the state makes available to those relying on the corporate form something 
that could not be attained privately.306
“Are managers sufficiently accountable?” and “on whose behalf are
companies run?” qualify as two additional questions that illustrate the potentially 
cyclical quality of corporate law scholarship.307  With respect to managerial 
accountability, as we have seen, Berle and Means’ The Modern and Corporation and 
Private Property flagged this as a pivotal topic.308  Until the 1980s, the consensus was 
Theory, in PROGRESSIVE (Mitchell), supra note xx, 67, 72-73; Carl Landauer, Beyond 
the Law and Economics Style:  Advancing Corporate Law in an Era of Downsizing 
and Corporate Reengineering, 84 CAL. L. REV. 1693, 1709-10 (1996).   
305 See supra notes xx to xx (fiction theory) and supra notes xx to xx (asset 
partitioning) and accompanying text.  For additional arguments that the fiction theory 
might have contemporary relevance, see Fiona Macmillan Patfield, Challenges for 
Company Law, in PERSPECTIVES ON COMPANY LAW:  1 1, 8-9 (Fiona Macmillan 
Patfield ed., 1995); Jennifer Hill, Visions and Revisions of the Shareholder, 48 AM. J. 
COMP. L. 39, 56-57 (2000).   
306 Note, though, that Hansmann and Kraakman downplay links between their 
asset-oriented analysis on the one hand and theories of juridical personality on the 
other:  Hansmann and Kraakman, Essential, supra note xx, at 438-39.   
307 An additional example involves shareholder voting rights.  In the 1950s, a 
popular view was that shareholders’ voting rights be abolished, but by the mid-1980s 
it was said that “in the wake of the tumultuous take-over wars of recent years, these 
views are unlikely to be put forward again, at least in the immediate future”:  
Hetherington, Redefining, supra note xx, at 235.  By 1999, though, Blair and Stout 
were wondering “(w)hy does corporate law provide for shareholder voting rights at 
all?”:  Team, supra note xx, at 312.   
308 Supra notes xx to xx and related discussion.   
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that state intervention was required to keep corporate executives in line.309
Contractarians subsequently adopted a more deregulatory posture but nevertheless did 
continue to focus on managerial accountability via agency cost theory.310  Corporate 
governance scandals afflicting major American companies such as Enron Corp. have 
kept the topic in the spotlight and might ultimately yield a intellectual pendulum 
swing back in favor of tighter regulation.311
Turning to corporate goals and responsibilities, legal debates on this stretch 
from the 1930s to the present day.312  The prevailing view under U.S. law is that 
companies exist for their shareholders.313  Some inferred from Berle and Means’ 
work, though, that companies must have obligations that extend beyond those owning 
equity.314  Contractual analysis was subsequently invoked to support the status quo.  
309 Supra notes xx to xx and accompanying text.
310 Supra notes xx to xx and related discussion.  
311 Alfred P. Carlton, 21st Century Corporate Responsibility – “Evolution, 
Revolution, or Back to the Future, 54 MERCER L. REV. 671, 672-73 (2002); for a plea 
that a “pendulum-like movement” be avoided, see Bengt Holmstrom and Steven N. 
Kaplan, The State of U.S. Corporate Governance:  What’s Right and What’s Wrong?, 
J. APPLIED CORP. FIN., Spring 2003, at 8, 20.  The cyclical quality of debates on 
managerial accountability has been recognized elsewhere.  See, for example, Bratton, 
Berle, supra note xx, 755-56; Bratton, Economic, supra note xx, 182; David Millon, 
Redefining Corporate Law, 24 IND. L. REV. 223, 225 (1991).    
312 Stout, Bad, supra note xx, at 1189-90, 1208; C.A. Harwell Wells, The Cycles 
of Corporate Social Responsibility:  An Historical Retrospective for the Twenty-first 
Century, 51 U. KAN. L. REV. 77, 78-79, 82 (2002).    
313 Supra notes xx to xx and related discussion.  
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Following on from this, the team production model and stakeholder-oriented 
scholarship currently offer a challenge to the notion of shareholder primacy.315
It may well be that in the area of corporate law there are certain questions 
which have endured as topics and will continue to do so.  Hence, it seems quite likely 
that in future decades academics will be asking “what is a corporation?”, “are 
managers sufficiently accountable?” and “on whose behalf are companies run?”316
Still, caution is required so as to avoid attaching undue weight to a cyclical account of 
corporate law theory.  
One reason to be circumspect is that the existence of perennial issues does not 
necessarily displace other potential trajectories we have considered thus far.  For 
instance, the presence of enduring questions can be consistent with evolution along 
Kuhnian lines.  This is because in order for a paradigm shift to occur, the new theory 
must not only be able to cope with the anomalies that caused a crisis for the old theory 
but also must address satisfactorily most, if not all, familiar problems.317
315 Supra notes xx to xx and related discussion.  On the team production model as 
a component of the long-standing debates on corporate social responsibility, see 
Wells, Cycles, supra note xx, at 136-39; Stout, Bad, supra note xx, at 1195.  For 
additional background on the cyclical quality of debates on corporate goals and 
responsibilities, see Branson, Corporate, supra note xx, at 635-39; Sommer, Whom, 
supra note xx, at 33-36; Roberta S. Karmel, The Independent Corporate Board:  A 
Means to What End?, 52 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 534, 535-43 (1984). 
316 William A. Bratton, Never Trust a Corporation, 70 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 867, 
867 (2002) (“corporate responsibility is problem that never goes away…from policy 
agendas in academic corporate law”).  
317 KUHN, supra note xx, 153, 169.  On the other hand, a cyclical account does 
not square fully with the Kuhnian characterization of science, since he argued that 
scientific development should be “a unidirectional and irreversible process”:  Id. at 
206. 
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Similarly, though a cyclical trajectory has a pessimistic connotation,318 the 
presence of enduring questions does not necessarily preclude potential “progress”.  
Consider managerial accountability.319  Contractarians admittedly explored issues that 
Berle and Means’ separation of ownership and control thesis had already raised.  Still, 
the effort to put corporate law on a different theoretical footing did have an effect on 
the discourse.320  Arguably, the explicit recognition of market forces constituted an 
intellectual advance since the resulting scholarship addressed a key paradox 
associated with the initial formulation of the separation of ownership and control 
thesis.321  This, again, is why did generations of investors continue to buy shares when 
they were being fooled or overpowered by self-serving executives?322
An additional reason a cyclical account of academic writing on corporate law 
should be treated with caution is that uncritical acceptance of this point of view might 
create a misleading impression of stability and predictability.  To elaborate, there may 
well be much more going on than the revisiting of the same issues again and again.  
Instead, it may be that “future contours of corporate legal theory are 
imponderable”.323  Past experience illustrates that the potential certainly exists for 
318 Supra note xx and accompanying text
319 The same point can potentially be made in relation to corporate goals and 
responsibilities:  Stout, Bad, supra note xx, at 1208 (arguing that even if the debate 
about the purpose of the corporation which has been going on since the 1930s has not 
been resolved, “there has been some progress in our understanding of it”). 
320 Bratton, Economic, supra note xx, at 182, n. 18.   
321 Johnston, Influence, supra note xx, at 231-41. 
322 Supra note xx and related discussion.   
323 DeMott, Trust, supra note xx, at 1335. 
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movements in apparently random directions.324  For instance, an academic writing at 
the beginning of the 1970s who forecast that an economically-oriented “prairie fire” 
was imminent probably would have been dismissed as foolish.  A prediction made a
decade or more later about the current interest in the study of social norms might well 
have yielded similar ridicule.325  It is fair to say, then, that one cannot outline how 
corporate law scholarship will evolve in the future simply by considering the past.   
G. Fads and Fashions in Corporate Law
The fact that seemingly unpredictable trends have emerged in the academic 
literature on corporate law does more than cast doubt on a cyclical account of 
literature in the discipline.  This pattern suggests also that the field might be subject to 
fads and fashions.  This is because Cass Sunstein, in arguing that “cascades” influence 
legal scholarship, maintains this means that it is difficult to foresee new trends in the 
academic study of law.  He reasons that, as in social life, “small sparks cause 
wildfires” in legal scholarship.326  Correspondingly, seemingly random movements 
“can produce a sudden ‘rush’ toward a particular methodology or point of view”.327
There certainly are aspects of corporate law scholarship that fall into line with 
Sunstein’s analysis of legal scholarship.  For instance, he asserts that external shocks 
324 Cf. Sunstein, supra note xx, at 1252 (making the same point about legal 
scholarship generally).   
325 Cf. id. 
326 Id.
327 Id. 
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can constitute a crucial reason why an academic bandwagon might start.328  The 
influence which Berle and Means’ work on the separation of ownership and control 
had can be accounted for at least partially on this basis.  In the 1920s, some observers 
drew attention to growing dispersion of share ownership and to the erosion of 
shareholder influence.329  These efforts were not ignored but failed to capture the 
imagination in the same manner Berle and Means’ analysis did.330  The stock market 
crash of 1929 and the ensuing Depression likely constituted a crucial intervening 
feature.  The audience for The Modern Corporation and Private Property likely was 
much more alert and receptive to Berle and Means’ critical analysis of revolutionary 
changes affecting U.S. corporations than would have been the case in better economic 
times.331
External shocks also plausibly contributed to the popularity of the nexus of 
contracts model.  According to Sunstein, developments in adjacent fields can help to 
prompt an academic cascade.332  This characterization is potentially apt for the 
economic analysis of corporate law.  This is because the work which economists 
began to do in the 1970s on the market dynamics functioning within firms provided 
328 Id. at 1262.
329 Tsuk, supra note xx, at 1883; Walter Werner, Management, Stock Market and 
Corporate Reform:  Berle and Means Reconsidered, 77 COLUM. L. REV. 388, 394-95 
(1977); George J. Stigler and Claire Friedland, The Literature of Economics:  The 
Case of Berle and Means, 26 J.L. & ECON. 237, 241 (1983).
330 Stigler and Friedland, supra note xx, at 241-42.
331 Werner, Management, supra note xx, at 395; Joseph L. Weiner, The Berle-
Dodd Dialogue on the Concept of the Corporation, 64 COLUM. L. REV. 1458, 1461 
(1964); Robert Hessen, The Modern Corporation and Private Property:  A 
Reappraisal, 26 J. L. &  ECON. 273, 279 (1983).
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the platform for the contractarian “prairie fire” which subsequently swept the 
corporate law field.333
The general intellectual climate may also have constituted an external shock 
that contributed to the “victory” of economic analysis.  There was a growing 
disenchantment with government regulation in the U.S. during the 1980s and, 
coincident with this, the analysis of private law issues was marked by an increasingly 
market-oriented conservatism.334  Corporate law scholarship fell directly into line with 
such trends.335  This is because academics embracing the nexus of contracts concept 
tended to presume that, as compared with government regulators, business 
participants typically do a better job of structuring transactions and addressing 
potentially contentious issues.336
Another aspect of Sunstein’s analysis of academic fads which is potentially 
pertinent for corporate law scholarship involves the presence of strongly-held views in 
332 Sunstein, supra note xx, at 1262. 
333 Supra notes xx to xx and related discussion.   
334 Elaine A. Welle, Freedom of Contract and the Securities Laws:  Opting Out of 
Securities Regulation by Private Agreement, 56 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 519, 524-25 
(1999).
335 Bratton, New, supra note xx, at 1524-25; Tsuk, supra note xx, at 1904; 
Cynthia A. Williams, Corporate Compliance with the Law in the Era of Efficiency, 76 
N.C. L. REV. 1265, 1287-88 (1998).
336 Robert B. Thompson, The Law’s Limits on Contracts in a Corporation, 15 J. 
CORP. L. 377, 388 (1990); ROBERT A. HILLMAN, THE RICHNESS OF CONTRACT LAW:  
AN ANALYSIS AND CRITIQUE OF CONTEMPORARY THEORIES OF CONTRACT LAW, 98-99 
(1997).  For examples of deregulatory bias, see Hetherington, Redefining, supra note 
xx, at 251-54, 257; McChesney, Economics, supra note xx, at 1544, 1548; Frank H. 
Easterbrook and Daniel R. Fischel, The Corporate Contract, 89 COLUM. L. REV.
1416, 1442 (1989).   
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an academic environment.  Sunstein describes the emergence and durability of fads in 
terms of reputational pressures and “group polarization”, where a like-minded group 
moves collectively via mutual self-reinforcement towards an extreme position.337  The 
skepticism towards dissent implied by this characterization of academic thought has 
arguably been evident in the area of corporate law.  For instance, when the separation 
of ownership and control thesis was the intellectual point of departure, most legal 
academics reacted with “cold disdain” to Manne’s critique of the managerialist thesis 
of the public corporation.338  Moving to the present, as we have seen, in the U.S. 
corporate law scholarship allegedly cannot succeed in the marketplace of ideas unless 
an economics of law perspective has been adopted.339
Assume, for the sake of argument, that there can be fads in the corporate law 
literature.  This still leaves open a key point concerning Sunstein’s analysis of legal 
scholarship.  Again, he is something of a “cascade pessimist” because he believes that 
bad ideas can potentially prosper for a long period of time.340  In other words, 
durability is not a reliable signal of quality.  More broadly, it cannot be taken for 
granted that ideas which become dominant within a discipline represent “progress” in 
any meaningful sense.  Instead, they may simply be the product of a bandwagon effect 
built upon a “wrong” outcome.  Applying this insight to the contemporary analysis of 
corporate law, the inference one can draw is that the economic approach which has 
337 Supra notes xx to xx and accompanying text. 
338 Manne, Intellectual, supra note xx, at 229.   
339 Supra note xx and related discussion. 
340 Supra notes xx to xx and accompanying text.  
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predominated in the literature for the past two decades (at least in the U.S.) has not 
done so because of the inherent merits of this mode of analysis.  
Is cascade pessimism appropriate in this instance?  Perhaps not.  The views 
expressed by critics of economic analysis are potentially revealing.  When the nexus 
of contracts model was novel, skeptics acknowledged that it was fashionable but said 
it was destined to fade away quickly.  For instance, one U.S. law professor proclaimed 
in 1988 that “the original contract paradigm had outlived its usefulness”341 and 
another subsequently said its advocates should “retool” and become “teachers of 
family law, or land use, or take up golf or serious gardening”.342  Moreover, this was 
the fate that was deserved since the economic approach to corporate law was flawed.  
As Melvin Eisenberg, a prominent critic, declared in 1990, “(t)he brute fact is that 
contractarian theory can have no meaningful application to an institution, like the 
publicly held corporation, that is essentially non-contractual in orientation”.343
Now the tone of debate has changed, at least in the U.S.  Increasingly, the 
nexus of contracts model has been accepted as a pivotal analytical construct.  Indeed, 
as mentioned, those with misgivings tend to use it as a point of departure rather than 
341 Bratton, Economic, supra note xx, at 197.  
342 Douglas M. Branson, The Death of Contractarianism and the Vindication of 
Structure and Authority in Corporate Governance and Corporate Law, in
PROGRESSIVE (Mitchell), supra note xx, 93, at 105.  See also Johnson, supra note xx, 
at 2218; Orts, Complexity, supra note xx, at 1569.  
343 Melvin A. Eisenberg, Contractarianism Without Contracts:  A Response to 
Professor McChesney , 90 COLUM. L. REV. 1321, 1331 (1990).  See further supra note 
xx and accompanying text. 
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seeking to dismiss it categorically.344  Melvin Eisenberg’s approach is illustrative.  
Though he retained his skepticism of the contractarian approach, by 1999 he was 
prepared to concede that the model was influential and captured at least a partial view 
of reality.345  Since even critics of economic analysis have been prepared to concede 
that it has made a helpful contribution, this may well not be an instance where a “bad” 
idea has prospered for a long period of time.   
In the area of corporate law, the fact that a durable theory such as the nexus of 
contracts model seemingly has intellectual merit may not be a coincidence.  Since the 
arrival of new information can correct quite quickly an initially mistaken cascade, a 
factor which likely influences the extent to which misguided academic fads persist is 
the “open” or “closed” nature of the intellectual discourse.346  Correspondingly, 
erroneous legal scholarship bandwagons should be more vulnerable to displacement 
when practicing lawyers and judges engage with the literature than when the relevant 
field is specialized, insulated and purely academic.  Richard Posner, as we have seen, 
has made this point by contrasting interdisciplinary legal scholarship dealing with 
moral philosophy (a closed network) and bankruptcy law (an open network).347
Assuming that the “open” or “closed” nature of discourse does influence the 
longevity of a mistaken fad, corporate law is a field where cascade optimism is 
appropriate.  This is because, as with bankruptcy law, the intellectual network is 
344 Supra note xx and related discussion.   
345 Eisenberg, Conception, supra note xx, at 818, 823, 827, 829; see also Millon, 
New, supra note xx, at 57.   
346 Supra note xx and related discussion.  
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outward looking, with there being an audience for theoretical corporate law 
scholarship outside law faculties.348  For example, in the United States allegedly 
“judicial opinions and practitioner publications are filled with the jargon of law and 
economics”.349  Also, Thomas Ulen, an expert on the economic analysis of law, has 
said about the corporate field that he is “not aware of any other area of the law where 
the connection between innovations in legal scholarship and the work of practitioners, 
judges and policy-makers has been quite so clear”.350  Even in the United Kingdom, 
where economic analysis has not had a substantial influence on corporate law 
scholarship,351 during the late 1990s the English and Scottish Law Commissions 
secured a contribution from law and economics experts as part of a review of the 
duties of company directors.352
The “open” nature of the intellectual discourse on corporate law is not a 
coincidence.  Instead, academics in the field -- including those who adopt an 
347 Supra notes xx to xx and accompanying text. 
348 Cheffins, Using, supra note xx, at 214-15. 
349 Stephen Bainbridge, Community and Statism:  A Conservative Contractarian 
Critique of Progressive Corporate Law Scholarship, 82 CORNELL L. REV. 856, 858-
59 (1997).
350 Thomas Ulen, The Coasean Firm in Law and Economics, 18 J. CORP. L. 301, 
331 (1993).   
351 Supra note xx and accompanying text. 
352 LAW COMMISSION AND SCOTTISH LAW COMMISSION, COMPANY DIRECTORS:  
REGULATING CONFLICTS OF INTERESTS AND FORMULATING A STATEMENT OF DUTIES
(Law Commission Consultation Paper No. 153), (1998), Part 3.  
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interdisciplinary approach -- are keen to engage issues of practical interest.353  As 
Deborah DeMott has said, “the recent literature (on corporate law) eagerly embraces 
as topics for study all manner of current developments in business and financial 
practice”.354  Assuming that “open” and “closed” discourse yield different outcomes 
with respect to academic fads, the strong link between practice and theory in the 
corporate law field suggests that “cascade optimism” is appropriate.  DeMott 
essentially concurs with this verdict, saying that the fact “current practice intrigues 
theoretically-oriented academics helps ensure that corporate law scholarship will not 
run dry”.355
IV. CONCLUSION
In recent decades, there has been an explosion in legal scholarship marked by 
the proliferation of new law reviews and the growing use of interdisciplinary 
analysis.356  Still, there has been little systematic analysis of the manner in which 
academic writing on law evolves over time.  This paper’s purpose has been to address 
this gap and offer insights concerning the development of legal scholarship.  The first 
353 For an example of an explicit acknowledgement of such an intention, see 
Lyman Johnson, New Approaches to Corporate Law, 50 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 1713, 
1723 (1993).   
354 DeMott, supra note xx, 1335. 
355 Id.
356 Philip C. Kissam, The Decline of Law School Professionalism, 134 U. PA. L. 
REV. 251, 297 (1986); Charles W. Collier, The Use and Abuse of Humanistic Theory 
in Law:  Reexamining the Assumptions of Interdisciplinary Legal Scholarship, 41 
DUKE L.J. 191, 203 (1991); Joseph P. Tomain and Paul L. Caron, The Associate Dean 
for Faculty Research Position:  Encouraging and Promoting Scholarship, 33 U. TOL. 
L. REV. 233, 237 (2001) (saying that if the “proliferation continues there will 
eventually be more law reviews than law teachers”).  
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step was to identify five potential trajectories.  Part II’s overview of the field indicates 
that all are plausible to at least some degree.  At the same time, no single account is 
fully convincing.357  Moreover, the various options yield lessons that are, at least in 
some measure, contradictory.358
To address such paradoxes and to shed light on the manner in which academic 
writing on law evolves, part III of the paper presented a case study of corporate law.  
The analysis offered confirms that each of the trajectories identified in part II can be 
relied upon to explain the evolution of corporate law scholarship.  For instance, Berle 
and Means’ pioneering work on the separation of ownership and control was at least 
partially scientific in its approach and the use of event studies helps to ensure that 
formal verification of hypotheses is a component of the contemporary theoretical 
literature.  With Kuhn’s work, characterizing corporate law scholarship in terms of 
paradigms, normal science and so on has proved to be a popular endeavor.  The 
marketplace for ideas may have had a beneficial impact on the literature since 
academic writing on corporate law has arguably become “better”, particularly in the 
past two or three decades.  At the same time, the presence of enduring questions has 
meant the literature has a cyclical aspect.  Finally, external shocks, reputational 
constraints and perhaps even “group polarization” have had an influence on corporate 
law scholarship, which implies that trends in the literature resemble fads or fashions.  
In addition to illustrating that each of the trajectories outlined in part II offers 
insights concerning the evolution of legal scholarship, the case study in part III 
357 See supra note xx and related discussion. 
358 See supra note xx and accompanying text.   
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affirmed that each has its limitations.  For example, much of the academic literature 
on corporate law is too normative in orientation to qualify as scientific enquiry.  
Kuhn’s analytical framework may not be directly relevant because the field has 
arguably lacked the sort of tight research consensus required for concepts such as 
“paradigms” and “normal science” to be relevant.  The hallmarks of “market failure” 
that afflict legal scholarship generally are pertinent with respect to corporate law, 
which implies that it cannot be taken for granted that the forces of supply and demand 
will yield “progress”.  Since the “future contours of corporate legal theory are 
imponderable”,359 a cyclical account of academic writing on the topic must 
necessarily be incomplete to some degree.  Finally, while applying terminology such 
as “fads” and “fashions” to academic concepts might imply superficiality, the “open” 
nature of corporate law discourse suggests theoretical approaches which become 
popular and endure are likely to have some form of intrinsic merit.  
A potential objection to the inferences drawn from the case study of corporate 
law is that the sample was not representative.  To the extent that this is true, 
trajectories that seem to be a good “fit” with corporate law may be irrelevant with 
respect to other areas.  To illustrate, while the profound influence which law and 
economics has had on corporate law scholarship means that a credible argument can 
be made that scientifically-oriented progress has been made in the field, there will be 
areas of the law where the situation will be different.  For instance, empirical 
methodology, with an attendant emphasis on verification and falsification, has 
359 See supra note xx and related discussion.
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apparently had little impact on constitutional or family law.360  In fields such as these, 
the trajectory of scholarship may entirely lack a scientific angle.    
It is unrealistic to expect that legal scholarship would develop at the same pace 
in all fields.  Instead, there will inevitably be some unevenness in the overall 
development and maturity of particular areas.361  Correspondingly, it should not be 
surprising that there are fields with trajectories somewhat different from corporate 
law.  This possibility does not necessarily undermine the value of the case study 
offered here, since it is unlikely that the academic writing associated with any 
particular area of the law could be perfectly representative of legal scholarship at 
large.   There would, however, be a serious problem if corporate law was profoundly 
out-of-step with general trends.  To take one example, tax would have been a 
problematic choice for a case study since the relevant literature is allegedly 
significantly behind the curve within the legal academy.362
With respect to corporate law, there admittedly has traditionally been 
something of a tendency within the legal academy to treat it as a lesser subject.363
Indeed, until two or three decades ago, academics in the field were essentially 
360 Heise, Past, supra note xx, at 819, 826; Ronald J. Allen, Two Aspects of Law 
and Theory, 37 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 743, 745 (2000); Barry Friedman, The Counter-
Majoritarian Problem and the Pathology of Constitutional Scholarship, 94 NW. U.L. 
REV. 933, 933, 951-52 (2001) (focusing on constitutional law).    
361 Heise, Past, supra note xx, at 826.
362 Michael A. Livingston, Reinventing Tax Scholarship:  Lawyers, Economists, 
and the Role of the Legal Academy, 83 CORNELL L. REV. 365, 383 (1998).  
363 Johnson, New, supra note xx, at 1721. 
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concurring with this gloomy assessment.364  Still, as we have seen, the subject has 
benefited from something of an intellectual renaissance in the period since.365  This, in 
turn, likely means that corporate law is in fact no longer seriously behind the curve.366
Correspondingly, the case study offered in part III likely does constitute a fair test of 
the trajectories outlined in part II and correspondingly lends legitimate support to the 
proposition that each is a plausible driver, albeit within limits.   
For those seeking decisive answers concerning the trajectory of legal 
scholarship, the tentative nature of the conclusions offered here might be somewhat 
disappointing.  A clear-cut outcome was not, however, really a serious prospect.  
After all, there is “no jurisprudence of legal scholarship” and drawing firm 
conclusions without additional evidence concerning particular subject areas would 
have been imprudent.  Given these caveats, the appropriate way to interpret the 
findings offered here is as a first step in a larger intellectual enquiry.  A series of 
plausible trajectories for legal scholarship has been identified and explained.  
Moreover, the case study of corporate law has confirmed that, to varying degrees, 
each is credible.  Correspondingly, for those who are interested in why ideas spread 
and prosper whereas other claims “burn out”, this paper offers a “test-driven” 
364 Supra notes xx to xx and related discussion.   
365 See supra notes xx to xx and accompanying text.
366 Livingston, Reinventing, supra note xx, at 385 (acknowledging that corporate 
law scholarship is, in key respects, significantly ahead of tax scholarship).  Corporate 
law scholarship may even be ahead of the curve in certain respects.  See, for example, 
Ulen, Nobel, supra note xx, at 911 (saying that academic debate might be helping to 
foster convergence towards the U.S. model of corporate governance, which would “be 
one of the first examples of an agreed-upon theoretical development across national 
boundaries in law”).    
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analytical framework that can be applied to discern how legal scholarship evolves 
over time.  
